474 Resisting Publics
espite the upheaval, Hizbullah failed to deliver on its promise of D
a fast government collapse,^57 and behind-the-scenes negotiations ended
the strike. In an attempt to calm the situation, Nasrallah issued a fatwa
calling on his supporters—and by extension all Lebanese—to immedi-
ately vacate the streets: “From the stance of a national, patriotic, ethical,
religious, and shari‘a duty ... I call on you to fully cooperate with all the
measures that the Lebanese Army is taking in order to ensure and uphold
peace and stability ... this fatwa is in the interest [mas.lah.a] of our country,
its civil peace, and peaceful coexistence ... we insist on using civil, demo-
cratic, and political means in expressing our political differences, and any
recourse to arms, from whichever party, is considered treason.”^58 Similar
entreaties were made by Speaker Berri and Sa’ad Hariri, the parliamen-
tary majority leader.^59 Nasrallah added: “Even if 1000 Hizbullahis die we
will not be led to fitna [discord] or take recourse to our weapons in the
domestic infighting.”^60
eaching out to the Hizbullah-led opposition, Prime Minister R
Sanyura came up with a proposal for ending the deadlock. He conceded
to the opposition’s demands by offering them two seats more than they
had asked for in the cabinet (13 out of 30), on condition of agreement
on a common political program based on the Seven Points, implementa-
tion of decisions reached in national dialogue sessions, and most impor-
tant, full implementation of UNSC Resolution 1701. Although Berri, the
speaker of the parliament and the leader of the Amal movement, agreed,
Hizbullah rejected the offer because this would eventually lead to its dis-
armament. However, Hizbullah did not put it bluntly; rather it argued that
it was unwilling to participate in a government headed by Sanyura, whom
the opposition held responsible for Lebanon’s socio-economic problems
since he served as minister of finance for twelve years in the previous
Hariri governments.
e conflict between the Hizbullah-led opposition and its support-Th
ers (8 March Group), on the one hand, and the Lebanese cabinet and
its supporters (14 March Trend), on the other, led to a bitter polariza-
tion that plunged Lebanon into a paralyzing political stalemate for over
a year, with periodic further escalations. For example, on 5 May 2007,
Hizbullah revoked its earlier acceptance of the Seven Points, calling
them “Condoleezza Rice’s orders to Sanyura,” as stated by Sayyid Nawwaf