The Language of Argument

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C o n d i t i o n a l s

or false. Yet it can be misleading to use a conditional on the basis of this logi-

cal feature. For example, it would be misleading for a museum guard to say,

“If you give me five dollars, then I will let you into the exhibition,” when,

in fact, he will admit you in any case. For Grice, this is misleading because

it violates the rule of Quantity. Yet strictly speaking, it is not false. Strictly

speaking, it is true.

The Grice line is attractive because, among other things, it allows us to

accept the truth-functional account of conditionals, with all its simplicity. Yet

sometimes it is difficult to swallow. Consider the following remark:

If God exists, then there is evil in the world.

If Grice’s analysis is correct, even the most pious person will have to admit

that this conditional is true provided only that he or she is willing to admit

that there is evil in the world. Yet, this conditional plainly suggests that there

is some connection between God’s existence and the evil in the world—

presumably, that is the point of connecting them in a conditional. The pious

will wish to deny this suggestion. All the same, this connection is something

that is conversationally implied, not asserted. So, once more, this conditional

could be misleading—and therefore is in need of criticism and correction—

but it is still, strictly speaking, true.

Philosophers and logicians have had various responses to Grice’s posi-

tion. No consensus has emerged on this issue. The authors of this book find

it adequate, at least in most normal cases, and therefore have adopted it.

This has two advantages: (1) The appeal to conversational rules fits in well

with our previous discussions, and (2) it provides a way of keeping the logic

simple and within the range of a beginning student. Other philosophers and

logicians continue to work toward a definition superior to the truth table

definition for indicative conditionals.

Other Conditionals in Ordinary Language

So far we have considered only one form in which propositional conditionals

appear in everyday language: the conditional “If p, then q.” But proposi-

tional conditionals come in a variety of forms, and some of them demand

careful treatment.

We can first consider the contrast between constructions using “if” and

those using “only if”:

1. I’ll clean the barn if Hazel will help me.


2. I’ll clean the barn only if Hazel will help me.
   Adopting the following abbreviations:
   B = I’ll clean the barn
   H = Hazel will help me

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