3 3 1se l f -se a l e r sor boring. If, to meet this charge, he or she says something quite specific
and important, then argument can proceed along normal lines. But it is not
always easy to pin people down in this way. This becomes clear if you exam-
ine an argument between a Marxist and an anti-Marxist, between a psycho-
analyst and a critic of psychoanalysis, or between individuals with different
religious views. Their positions are often sealed against objections from each
other, and then their arguments are almost always at cross-purposes.
Although we have emphasized how large-scale ideologies can become
self-sealing, small-scale claims in everyday life are also often sealed against
any possible refutation. In fact, a number of common words are used to this
end. If someone says, “All true conservatives support school prayer,” and a
critic points out a conservative who opposes school prayer, then the original
claim might be defended by saying, “He is not truly (or really) a conserva-
tive.” If this response is trotted out in every case, it turns out that the original
claim does not exclude anything. Similarly, the claim that “some students
need to work harder than others, but if any student works hard enough,
he or she will get good grades” can be protected simply by declaring that
any student who works hard but does not get good grades does not work
hard enough. Finally, someone who says, “If you think it over thoroughly,
you will agree with me” can dismiss anyone who disagrees simply by deny-
ing that he thought it over thoroughly. Of course, these terms—“true,” “real,”
“thorough(ly),” and “enough”—do not always make positions self-sealing.
Nonetheless, these and other common terms are often used to seal positions
against any possible criticism. When these terms are used in these ways, the
resulting positions are empty and can be criticized in the same ways as self-
sealing ideologies.- Antony Flew famously wrote:
Now it often seems to people who are not religious as if there was no conceivable
event or series of events the occurrence of which would be admitted by sophisticated
religious people to be a sufficient reason for conceding “There wasn’t a God after all”
or “God does not really love us then.” Someone tells us that God loves us as a father
loves his children. We are reassured. But then we see a child dying of inoperable
cancer of the throat. His earthly father is driven frantic in his efforts to help, but his
Heavenly Father shows no obvious sign of concern. Some qualification is made—
God’s love is “not merely human love” or it is “an inscrutable love,” perhaps—and
we realize that such offerings are quite compatible with the truth of the assertion
that “God loves us as a father (but, of course.. .).” We are reassured again. But then
perhaps we ask: what is this assurance of God’s (appropriately qualified) love worth,
what is this apparent guarantee really a guarantee against? Just what would have to
happen not merely (morally and wrongly) to tempt us but also (logically and rightly)
to entitle us to say “God does not love us” or even “God does not exist”?^2
Discussion Questions(continued)97364_ch16_ptg01_323-332.indd 331 15/11/13 11:07 AM
some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s). Editorial review has deemed that any suppressed content does not materiallyCopyright 201^3 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. Due to electronic rights,
affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.