3 8 9T h e P r o b l e m o f A b o r t i o nPro-life conservatives usually emphasize tests such as genetic code (which
is formed at conception) or ensoulment (which is supposed to occur at or
shortly after conception). In contrast, pro-choice liberals usually employ
tests such as viability (which is reached during the second trimester) or ra-
tionality (which comes sometime after birth, depending on what counts as
rationality—ability to choose and plan, self-consciousness, and so on). Thus,
the personhood of fetuses during the first trimester is usually asserted by
conservatives and denied by liberals on this issue.
How can we determine whether a feature is necessary or sufficient for
personhood? We can start by rejecting any test of personhood that leads to
implausible results. Pro-life conservatives argue that rationality is not neces-
sary for personhood, because, whatever rationality is, newborn babies and
severely retarded adults are not rational, but it is still morally wrong to kill
them. Other tests of personhood are ruled out because they do not seem im-
portant enough. Pro-choice liberals argue that a certain genetic code is not
sufficient to make something a person, because there is no reason to favor
one genetic code over another except that it later produces other important
features, such as rationality. It is also common to rule out a test of person-
hood if we cannot know when the test is passed. For example, many peo-
ple reject ensoulment as a criterion of personhood, because they see no way
to tell when, if ever, a fetus has a soul. And tests of personhood are also
often rejected if they depend on factors that are extraneous. Conservatives
often argue that viability cannot be a test of personhood, because the point
when a fetus can survive outside the womb depends on what technology
happens to be available to doctors at the time.
In addition to features that fetuses have when they are fetuses, they also
seem to have the potential to develop many more, including rationality.
Opponents of abortion often use this premise to argue that fetuses are per-
sons and have a right to life. The first problem with this argument is that it
seems to assume that something has a right if it has the potential to come
to have that right. But this is clearly too strong. A three-year-old child does
not have the right to vote even though it has the potential to develop into
someone who will have the right to vote. Furthermore, the notion of poten-
tial is not clear. If the fetus has the potential, why do the egg and sperm not
have it? This does not refute potentiality as a test of personhood, but much
more must be done to show what potentiality is and why it is sufficient to
make something a person even before the potential is realized.
All these positions on personhood are controversial, and many people
feel uncertain about which is the correct one. A major issue in many moral
problems is how to deal with uncertainties such as this. One reaction is a
position called “gradualism.”^2 We have assumed so far that the fetus either
has a full right to life or has no right to life at all, but rights sometimes come
in varying strengths. Gradualists claim that a fetus slowly develops a right
to life that is at first very weak. As pregnancy progresses, this right gets
stronger, so it takes more to justify abortion. Late abortions still might be97364_ch19_ptg01_383-422.indd 389 11/15/13 5:45 PM
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