3 9 1T h e P r o b l e m o f A b o r t i o nthat it is unfair to the slave class. (See the discussion of counterexamples in
Chapter 17.) For reasons of this kind, most people would modify premise (1)
in the following way:
(1*) An action that best increases human welfare is not morally wrong,
provided that it is not unfair.
But if the first premise is modified in this way, then the entire argument
must be restated to reflect this revision. It will now look like this:
(1*) An action that best increases human welfare is not morally wrong,
provided that it is not unfair.
(2*) Abortion is sometimes an action that best increases human welfare.
∴(3*) Abortion is sometimes not morally wrong, provided that it is not
unfair.
It should be obvious how opponents of abortion will reply to this argu-
ment. They will maintain that abortion almost always involves unfairness—
namely, to the fetus—so abortion is still wrong in almost all cases, as the
pro-life argument claimed. Once more we have encountered a standard situ-
ation: Given a strong premise (premise 1), it is possible to derive a particular
conclusion, but this strong premise is subject to criticism and therefore must
be modified. When the premise is modified as in 1*, it no longer supports
the original conclusion that the person presenting the argument wishes to
establish.
The argument does not stop here. A defender of abortion might reply in a
number of ways. Some theory of fairness might be developed to argue that
many abortions are not unfair to the fetus, because the fetus has no right to
use the pregnant woman’s body. The burden of the argument may shift to
the question of whether or not a human fetus is a person and therefore pos-
sessed of a right to fair treatment. It might also be argued that questions of
human welfare are sometimes more important than issues of fairness. Dur-
ing war and some emergencies, for example, members of a certain segment
of the population are called on to risk their lives for the good of the whole in
ways that might seem unfair to them.
When the argument is put on this new basis, the question becomes this:
Are there circumstances in which matters of welfare become so urgent that
the rights of the fetus (assuming the fetus has rights) are overridden? The
obvious case in which this might happen is when the life of the bearer of the
fetus is plainly threatened. For many conservatives on abortion, abortion is
permitted in such cases. Some who hold a pro-choice position will main-
tain that severe psychological, financial, or personal losses to the pregnant
woman may also take precedence over the life of the fetus. Furthermore,
if not aborted, many fetuses would live in very deprived circumstances,
and some would not develop very far or live very long, because they have
deadly diseases, such as Tay-Sachs. How severe must these losses, depri-
vations, and diseases be? From our previous discussion of slippery-slope97364_ch19_ptg01_383-422.indd 391 11/15/13 5:45 PM
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