The Language of Argument

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C H A P T E R 1 9 ■ M o r a l R e a s o n i n g

thinks we will, that it is not wrong to unplug the violinist, then we have a

reason to conclude that abortion after rape is not wrong either.

Responses to Thomson’s argument have largely turned on emphasizing

the differences between the two situations. Many critics claim that Thom-

son’s argument fails because abortion involves killing, whereas unplugging

does not. If you stay plugged to the violinist, this will save the violinist, so to

unplug yourself is to fail to save the violinist. But critics deny that to unplug

yourself from the violinist is the same as to kill the violinist, or to take the

violinist’s life. They argue that there is a crucial difference between killing

and failing to save, because a negative duty not to kill is much stronger than

any positive duty to save another person’s life.

To determine whether unplugging the violinist is more like acts of killing

or more like other acts of refusing to save, we might consider more analogies.

Thomson also introduces additional analogies that seem more like abortions

in which the pregnancy is not due to rape. In the end, our sense of which fea-

tures seem most important will determine how we evaluate all such analogi-

cal arguments. The analogies bring certain features to our attention, but we

have to decide which features are important, and how important they are.

Weighing Factors

Our discussion has brought us to the following point: Disagreements con-

cerning abortion in general cannot be reduced to a yes–no dispute. Most

opponents of abortion acknowledge that abortion is permissible in some

(though very few) cases. Most defenders of abortion admit that there are

some (though not restrictively many) limitations on when abortion is per-

missible. Where people place themselves on this continuum does not

depend on any simple acceptance of one argument over another, but instead

on the weight they give certain factors. To what extent does a fetus have

rights? The pro-life position we examined earlier grants the fetus a full (or

close to full) right to life. The pro-choice position usually grants few or no

rights to the fetus. In what areas do questions of welfare override certain

individual rights? The conservative in this matter usually restricts this to

those cases in which the very life of the mother is plainly threatened. As the

position on abortion becomes more liberal, the more extensive becomes the

range of cases in which the rights, if any, of the fetus are set aside in favor

of the rights of the bearer of the fetus. Where a particular person strikes this

balance is not only a function of basic moral beliefs but also a function of dif-

ferent weights assigned to them.

How can one deal with such bedrock disagreements? The first thing to

see is that logic alone will not settle them. Starting from a certain conception

of persons, it is possible to argue coherently for a pro-choice view on abor-

tion; starting from another point of view, it is possible to argue coherently

for a pro-life view on abortion. The next important thing to see is that it is

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