The Language of Argument

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C H A P T E R 1 9 ■ M o r a l R e a s o n i n g

an ‘inconvenience’, as opponents of abortion often claim. To carry a preg-

nancy to term is an arduous and risky undertaking, even when voluntary. To

be sure, many women enjoy (much of) their pregnancies; but for those who

remain pregnant against their will the experience is apt to be thoroughly

miserable. And involuntary pregnancy and childbirth are only the begin-

ning of the hardships caused by the denial of abortion. The woman must

either keep the child or surrender it for adoption. To keep the child may

make it impossible to continue her chosen life work, or to meet her other

family obligations. To surrender the child means that she must live with the

unhappy knowledge that she has a daughter or son for whom she cannot

care, often cannot even know to be alive and well. Studies of women who

have surrendered infants for adoption show that, for most, the separation

from their child is a great and lasting grief.

Even if we accept the view that fetuses have a right to life, it is difficult to

justify the imposition of such hardships upon unwilling individuals for the

sake of fetal lives. As Judith Thomson pointed out in her much-discussed

1971 article, ‘A defense of abortion’, there is no other case in which the law

requires individuals (who have been convicted of no crime) to sacrifice

liberty, self- determination, and bodily integrity in order to preserve the lives

of others. Perhaps one analogy to involuntary childbirth is military con-

scription. However, that comparison can lend only moderate support to the

anti-abortion position, since the justifiability of compulsory military service

is itself debatable.

In popular rhetoric, especially in the United States, the abortion issue is

often seen as purely and simply one of ‘women’s right to control their bod-

ies’. If women have the moral right to abort unwanted pregnancies, then

the law should not prohibit abortion. But the arguments for this right do

not entirely solve the moral issue of abortion. For it is one thing to have a

right, and another to be morally justified in exercising that right in a particu-

lar case. If fetuses have a full and equal right to life, then perhaps women’s

right to abort should be exercised only in extreme circumstances. And per-

haps we should question further whether fertile human beings — of either

sex — are entitled to engage in heterosexual intercourse when they are not

willing to have a child and assume the responsibility for it. If popular het-

erosexual activities are costing the lives of millions of innocent ‘persons’ (i.e.

aborted fetuses), then should we not at least try to give up these activities?

On the other hand, if fetuses do not yet have a substantial right to life, then

abortion is not nearly so difficult to justify.

iv Questions About the Moral Status of fetuses

When in the development of a human individual does she or he begin to

have a full and equal right to life? Most contemporary legal systems treat

birth as the point at which a new legal person comes into existence. Thus,

infanticide is generally classified as a form of homicide, whereas abortion —

even where prohibited — generally is not. But, at first glance, birth seems to

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