4 0 1W e i g h i n g fa c t o r sbe an entirely arbitrary criterion of moral status. Why should human beings
attain full and equal basic moral rights at birth, rather than at some earlier or
later point?
Many theorists have sought to establish some universal criterion of
moral status, by which to distinguish between those entities that have full
moral rights and those that have no moral rights, or different and lesser
rights. Even those who prefer not to speak of moral rights may feel the
need for a universally applicable criterion of moral status. For instance,
utilitarians need to know which entities have interests that must be consid-
ered in calculations of moral utility, while Kantian deontologists need to
know which things are to be treated as ends in themselves, and not merely
means to the ends of others. Many criteria of moral status have been pro-
posed. The most common include life, sentience (the capacity to have expe-
riences, including that of pain), genetic humanity (biological identification
as belonging to the species Homo sapiens), and personhood (which will be
defined later).
How are we to choose among these conflicting criteria of moral status?
Two things are clear. First, we may not treat the selection of a criterion of
moral status as a mere matter of personal preference. Racists, for instance,
are not entitled to recognize the moral rights only of members of their own
racial group, since they have never been able to prove that members of
‘inferior ’ races lack any property that can reasonably be held to be relevant
to moral status. Second, a theory of moral status must provide a plausible
account of the moral status not only of human beings, but also of non-
human animals, plants, computers, possible extraterrestrial life forms, and
anything else that might come along. I will argue that life, sentience and
personhood are all relevant to moral status, though not in the same ways.
Let us consider these criteria in turn, beginning with the most basic, i.e.
biological life.v The Ethic of ‘Reverence for Life’
Albert Schweitzer argued for an ethic of reverence for all living things. He
held that all organisms, from microbes to human beings, have a ‘will to live’.
Thus, he says, anyone who has ‘an unblunted moral sensibility will find
it natural to share concern with the fate of all living creatures’, Schweitzer
may have been wrong to claim that all living things have a will to live. Will
is most naturally construed as a faculty which requires at least some capac-
ity for thought, and is thus unlikely to be found in simple organisms that
lack central nervous systems. Perhaps the claim that all living things share
a will to live is a metaphorical statement of the fact that organisms are teleo-
logically organized, such that they generally function in ways that promote
their own survival or that of their species. But why should this fact lead us
to feel a reverence for all life?
I suggest that the ethic of reverence for life draws strength from ecological
and aesthetic concerns. The destruction of living things often damages what97364_ch19_ptg01_383-422.indd 401 11/15/13 5:45 PM
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