4 0 6C H A P T E R 1 9 ■ M o r a l R e a s o n i n gthis theory, so long as an individual is both human and capable of sentience,
his or her moral equality cannot be questioned. But there is an objection to
the extension of equal moral status even to sentient fetuses: it is impossible in
practice to grant equal moral rights to fetuses without denying those same
rights to women.ix Why birth Matters Morally
There are many instances in which the moral rights of different human in-
dividuals come into apparent conflict. Such conflicts cannot, as a rule, be
solved justly by denying equal moral status to one of the parties. But preg-
nancy is a special case. Because of the unique biological relationship be-
tween the woman and the fetus, the extension of equal moral and legal status
to fetuses has ominous consequences for women’s basic rights.
One consequence is that abortion ‘on request’ would not be permitted. If
sentience is the criterion, then abortion might be permitted only in the first
trimester. Some argue that this is a reasonable compromise, since it would
allow most women time enough to discover that they are pregnant, and
decide whether or not to abort. But problems involving fetal abnormality,
the woman’s health, or her personal or economic situation, sometimes arise
or become severe only at a later stage. If fetuses are presumed to have the
same moral rights as already-born human beings, then women will often be
compelled to remain pregnant at great risk to their own lives, health, or per-
sonal well-being. They may also be compelled to submit, against their will, to
dangerous and invasive medical procedures such as Caesarean section, when
others judge that this would be beneficial to the fetus. (A number of such
cases have already occurred in the United States.) Thus, the extension of full
and equal basic moral rights to fetuses endangers the basic rights of women.
But, given these apparent conflicts between fetal rights and women’s
rights, one may still wonder why it is women’s rights that should prevail.
Why not favour fetuses instead, e.g. because they are more helpless, or have
a longer life expectancy? Or why not seek a compromise between fetal and
maternal rights, with equal concessions on each side? If fetuses were already
persons, in the sense I have described, then it would be arbitrary to favour
the rights of woman over theirs. But it is difficult to argue that either fetuses or
newborn infants are persons in this sense, since the capacities for reason, self-
awareness, and social and moral reciprocity seem to develop only after birth.
Why, then, should we treat birth, rather than some later point, as the
threshold of moral equality? A major reason is that birth makes it possible
for the infant to be granted equal basic rights without violating anyone else’s
basic rights. It is possible in many countries to find good homes for most
infants whose biological parents are unable or unwilling to raise them. Since
most of us strongly desire to protect infants, and since we can now do so
without imposing excessive hardships upon women and families, there is
no evident reason why we should not. But fetuses are different: their equal-
ity would mean women’s inequality. Other things being equal, it is worse97364_ch19_ptg01_383-422.indd 406 11/15/13 5:45 PM
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