4 0 7W e i g h i n g fa c t o r sto deny the basic moral rights to beings that are clearly not yet full persons.
Since women are persons and fetuses are not, we should come down on the
side of respecting women’s rights in cases of apparent conflict.x Potential Personhood
Some philosophers argue that, although fetuses may not be persons, their po-
tential to become persons gives them the same basic moral rights. This argu-
ment is implausible, since in no other case do we treat the potential to achieve
some status entailing certain rights as itself entailing those same rights. For
instance, every child born in the United States is a potential voter, but no-
one under the age of 18 has the right to vote in that country. Besides, the ar-
gument from potential proves too much. If a fetus is a potential person, then
so is an unfertilized human ovum, together with enough viable spermatazoa
to achieve fertilization; yet few would seriously suggest that these living hu-
man entities should have full and equal moral status.
Yet the argument from fetal potential refuses to go away. Perhaps this is
because the potential which fetuses have is often a sound reason for valuing
and protecting them. Once a pregnant woman has committed herself to the
continued nurturance of the fetus, she and those close to her are likely to
think of it as an ‘unborn baby’, and to value it for its potential. The fetus’s
potential lies not just in its DNA, but in that maternal (and paternal) com-
mitment. Once the woman has committed herself to the pregnancy, it is
appropriate for her to value the fetus and protect its potential — as most
women do, without any legal coercion. But it is wrong to demand that a
woman complete a pregnancy when she is unable or unwilling to undertake
that enormous commitment.xi Summary and Conclusion
Abortion is often approached as if it were only an issue of fetal rights; and
often as if it were only an issue of women’s rights. The denial of safe and legal
abortion infringes upon women’s rights to life, liberty, and physical integ-
rity. Yet if the fetus had the same right to life as a person, abortion would still
be a tragic event, and difficult to justify except in the most extreme cases.
Thus, even those who argue for women’s rights must be concerned with the
moral status of fetuses.
Even an ethic of reverence for all life does not, however, preclude all inten-
tional killing. All killing requires justification, and it is somewhat more diffi-
cult to justify the deliberate destruction of a sentient being than of a living
thing which is not (yet) a centre of experience; but sentient beings do not
all have equal rights. The extension of equal moral status to fetuses threat-
ens women’s most basic rights. Unlike fetuses, women are already persons.
They should not be treated as something less when they happen to be preg-
nant. That is why abortion should not be prohibited, and why birth, rather
than some earlier point, marks the beginning of full moral status.97364_ch19_ptg01_383-422.indd 407 11/15/13 5:45 PM
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