C H A P T E R 2 2 ■ P h i l o s o p h i c a l R e a s o n i n g
4 6 8if our choices play no causal role in bringing about those bodily movements.
We seem no more free than a person having an epileptic seizure, whose
bodily movements do not result from will or choice. This second challenge
arises from the tendency of scientific explanations, at least in physics and
neuroscience, to work without mentioning mental states at all.
A third problem for free will and responsibility concerns the sources of
our mental states and actions. Psychologists and sociologists emphasize
that the physical, social, and cultural environment in which we make our
choices influences what we choose. They sometimes go further and suggest
that our choices and actions are determined by our environment, such that
anybody else would have done the same thing in the same circumstances. If
so, then people who act badly are merely unlucky to have encountered the
circumstances that caused them to act badly. Their bad actions do not show
anything bad about them or their characters if anybody else in their circum-
stances would have done the same bad acts. Moreover, we do not choose
and are not responsible for the environment in which we live. That makes
it hard to understand how we could be free or responsible for choices and
actions that result from the unchosen environment. Of course, opponents
respond that our environments or circumstances do not totally determine
what we choose or do, so at least part of the source of our actions lies in
our selves—or perhaps in some special part of our selves called the deep self.
Then these philosophers argue that we are responsible when our actions are
caused by a deep self with certain special properties, such as rationality or
responsiveness to reasons or to truth and goodness.
This kind of view is developed by Susan Wolf in our readings. Wolf
describes and criticizes some views of the “deep self” and then argues for her
own variation, which is supposed to explain how and why people can be free
and responsible despite all of science. Derk Pereboom then responds that any
deep self can be manipulated and caused in ways that are incompatible with
real freedom and responsibility. As you read through these selections, it will
be useful to keep in mind all three of the challenges to free will and respon-
sibility: the problems of determinism, of bypassing, and of sourcehood. Ask
yourself which issue is being addressed at each point in the readings.- Which is the best solution to the problem of determinism: hard determin-
ism, libertarianism, or compatibilism? Why? - If a neuroscientist fully explained a person’s bodily movements by citing
only electrical and chemical events in that person’s brain (along with en-
ergy and matter entering that person’s body from outside), would that ex-
planation convince you that the person’s mental states did not cause the
bodily movements (so the mental states are “bypassed”)? Would it con-
vince you that the person is not free and responsible? Why or why not?
Discussion Questions97364_ch22_ptg01_465-494.indd 468 15/11/13 12:14 3M
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