C H A P T E R 2 2 ■ P h i l o s o p h i c a l R e a s o n i n g
4 8 8non-responsibility in Case 1 generalizes to non-responsibility in Case 4. We
should conclude that if an action results from any deterministic causal proc-
ess that traces back to factors beyond the agent’s control, then she will lack
the control required to be morally responsible for it.- Agent-Causal Libertarianism and an Objection from Our Best
Physical Theories.
A number of different libertarian theories have been proposed, but let us
examine the agent-causal version, since it is particularly intuitive and
attractive. This view claims that we agent possess a special causal power—a
power for an agent, fundamentally as a substance, to cause a decision, and
thereby to settle which of a number of competing possible decisions occurs,
without being causally determined to do so. But can this position be recon-
ciled with what we would expect given our best physical theories? When
an agent makes a free decision, she causes the decision without being caus-
ally determined. On the path to action that results from this undetermined
decision, changes in the physical world, for example in the agent’s brain or
some other part of her body, are produced. But if the physical world were
generally governed by deterministic laws, it seems that here we would en-
counter divergences from these laws. For the changes in the physical world
that result from the undetermined decision would themselves not be caus-
ally determined, and they would thus not be governed by the deterministic
laws. For this reason, agent-causal libertarianism is not plausibly reconciled
with the physical world’s being governed by deterministic laws.
On the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, however, the physi-
cal world is not in fact deterministic, but is rather governed by probabilistic
statistical laws. Some philosophers have defended the claim that agent-causal
libertarianism can be reconciled with physical laws of this sort. However,
wild coincidences would also arise on this suggestion. Consider the class of
possible actions each of which has a physical component whose antecedent
probability of occurring is approximately 0.32. It would not violate the statisti-
cal laws in the sense of being logically incompatible with them if, for a large
number of instances, the physical components in this class were not actually
realized close to 32% of the time. Rather, the force of the statistical law is that
for a large number of instances it is correct to expect physical components in
this class to be realized close to 32% of the time. Are free choices on the agent-
causal libertarian model compatible with what the statistical law leads us to
expect about them? If they were, then for a large enough number of instances
the possible actions in our class would almost certainly be freely chosen close
to 32% of the time. But if the occurrence of these physical components were
settled by the choices of agent-causes, then their actually being chosen close to
32% of the time would amount to a wild coincidence. The proposal that agent-
caused free choices do not diverge from what the statistical laws predict for
the physical components of our actions would run so sharply counter to what
we would expect as to make it incredible.
97364_ch22_ptg01_465-494.indd 488 15/11/13 12:14 3M
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