The Language of Argument

C H A P T E R 2 2 ■ P h i l o s o p h i c a l R e a s o n i n g

4 9 4

its object is morally responsible for immoral behavior. Destructive moral

anger in relationships is nurtured in this way by the assumption that the

other is blameworthy. The anger that fuels ethnic conflicts, for example, is

almost always fostered by the conviction that a group of people deserves

blame for past wrongs. Hard incompatibilism advocates giving up such

beliefs because they are false. As a result, moral anger might decrease, and

its expressions subside.

Would the benefits that would result if moral anger were modified in this

way compensate for the losses that would ensue? Moral anger motivates us

to oppose wrongful behavior. Would we lose the motivation to oppose im-

morality? If for hard incompatibilist reasons the assumption that wrongdo-

ers are blameworthy is withdrawn, the belief that they have in fact behaved

immorally would not be threatened. Even if those who commit genocide

are not morally responsible, their actions are nonetheless clearly horribly

immoral, and a conviction that this is so would remain untouched. This,

together with a commitment to oppose wrongdoing, would permit a resolve

to resist abuse, discrimination, and oppression. Accepting hard incompatibi-

lism would thus allow us to retain the benefits moral anger can also provide,

while at the same time challenging its destructive effects.

NOTES

(^1) From Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Responsibility, ed. Ferdinand
Schoeman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
(^2) From The Truth about the World: Basic Readings in Philosophy, ed. James Rachels and Stuart
Rachels (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011).

1. Explain Pereboom’s four-case argument. Is it a slippery-slope argument of
   the kind discussed in Chapter 13? Is it an inference to “the best explanation
   for the intuition that Plum is not morally responsible in the first three cases”
   like those discussed in Chapter 9?


2. How is Pereboom’s argument related to the challenges of determinism and
   bypassing that were discussed in the introduction to this chapter?


3. How could Wolf best respond to Pereboom’s argument?


4. Can we be justified in punishing people who break criminal laws when
   they are neither free nor responsible? If so, how? If not, then how should
   our criminal laws be reformed—if arguments such as Pereboom’s show that
   people are never free or responsible?


5. Can life have meaning for people who are neither free nor responsible?

Discussion Questions

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