116 Philip S. Gorski
model. I will refer to their approach as the sociopolitical conflict model (henceforth:
SPCM).^4
In the English-speaking world, the best known and most cogent proponents of the
SPCM are probably David Martin (in sociology) and Hugh McLeod (in history) (Martin
1978; McLeod 1995, 1996; see also Hollinger 1996). On first reading, their views may ̈
seem very similar to those of Stark et al., insofar as they stress the effects of “competi-
tion” and “pluralism.” And, in fact, members of the religious economies school often
cite proponents of the sociopolitical conflict model in support of their own positions.
On closer inspection, however, the resemblance between the two models proves to be
superficial, for when Martin and McLeod speak of “competition,” they mean competi-
tion not only between different churches, as in the REM, but also competition between
different worldviews, both religious and secular. In particular, they argue that Protes-
tant, Catholic, and Jewish religious communities were competing, not just with one an-
other but also with “political religions,” such as socialism, liberalism, nationalism, and,
later, fascism. Similarly, when McLeod and Martin discuss the effects of “pluralism,”
they understand them in political rather than (quasi-)economic terms. Their central
line of argument could be summarized as follows: In situations of religious monopoly,
church and state will tend to become closely identified with one another, and social
protest and partisan opposition will tend to evolve in an anticlerical or anti-Christian
direction; a high level of religious disengagement is the result. In situations of religious
pluralism, by contrast, in which some churches and church leaders are institutionally
and politically independent of the state and the ruling elite, opposition to the existing
regime did not automatically translate into opposition to the religionper se, and could
even be expressed in religious terms; here, the degree of religious disengagement is
likely to be lower.
The advantage of this approach can be seen in its ability to account for one of the
major anomalies generated by the religious economies approach, namely, the paradox-
ical combination of decreasing “vitality” with increasing “pluralism” and decreasing
“regulation,” which can be observed in many parts of the West beginning in the late
nineteenth century.^5 From the perspective of the SPCM, the decrease in “vitality” – in
orthodox belief, belonging and participation –wasthe result of competition, but the
competition came, not from other churches, but rather, from nonreligious movements,
which offered many goods previously monopolized by the church: Comprehensive
worldviews, a social safety net, and communal and associational life. One of the things
that these movements often fought for was a loosening of ties between church and
state – that is, a decrease in religious “regulation.” In this, they were sometimes aided
and abetted by “sectarian” religious movements, who bridled at the privileges of state
churches. To the degree that they were successful, these campaigns against religious
(^4) It should be emphasized at the outset that the “sociopolitical conflict model” is not a model
in quite the same sense or the same degree as secularization theory or the religious economies
approach, since it is not rooted in a general theory of social change (e.g., “modernization
theory”) or human behavior (e.g., “neoclassical economics”) and is not associated with a par-
ticular “school” or discipline. Rather, it is an interpretive framework that has emerged out of
the historical researches of a loose-knit group of scholars.
(^5) Interestingly, there is now some research that suggests that the recent increase in religious
nonaffiliation in the United States may be partly a reaction to the close ties between Christian
fundamentalists and conservative Republicans. On this, see Hout and Fischer (2002).