118 Philip S. Gorski
the SPCM suggests a much more concrete and clear-cut explanation of macro-societal
secularization, an approach that focuses on battles between religious and secularist
movements for control of particular institutions and sectors, such as schools and edu-
cation, or marriage and moral counseling. Indeed, scholars working within this tradi-
tion have already produced case studies of societal secularization for specific countries
and contexts (for overviews and references, see Bauberot 1994). What they have not
produced, at least not yet, are systematic typologies and comparisons, which would al-
low one to classify and explain the forms and degrees of macro-societal secularization
across various countries and contexts. This, too, is an area in which sociologists might
be able to contribute.
Unlike its rivals, then, the SPCM suggests clear and plausible answers for one of
the key questions that confronts contemporary sociologists and historians of religion,
namely: What explains the recent historical trends and cross-national variations in
both Christian religious practice and macro-societal secularization? There are at least
two other sets of questions, though, which the SPCM doesnotanswer – or even begin
to address. We have already encountered the first. It concerns the theoretical interpre-
tation of the historical trends, whether they point to decline, downturn, transition, or
transformation. These are not the kinds of questions that are susceptible to a definitive
answer; the social sciences are often poor at predicting the future. But it would be pos-
sible to shed some light on them, by situating the present more firmly within the past.
Thus, one of the key tasks for future research will be to put what we know about the
modern trends into historical perspective. The first step in this process would be to trace
out the ups and downs – for ups and downs – in Christian practice and ecclesiastical
authority as far back as the historical literatures and sources allow. In the case of eccle-
siastical authority, this should not be a difficult task. The institutional history of the
Western Church and its involvement in politics, education, charity, art, the family and
other fields are well documented and well studied. Tracking the level of Christian belief
and practice across time would be a more difficult undertaking, but not an impossible
one. Early modern and medieval historians have unearthed a great deal of evidence on
the religious practices of the premodern populace, some of it quantitative in form. By
mining local and regional studies, and combining them with modern sources, such as
census data and survey research, it should be possible to piece together some sort of
picture of religious participation for various parts of Europe perhaps as far back as the
late Middle Ages.
The next step in the process would be to put the patterns themselves in context –
to figure out what they tell us about changes in religiosityper se. In this regard, it is
important to bear in mind that variations in religious participation are not necessarily
the result of variations in individual religiosity. They also can be – and sometimes are –
caused by social factors such as the geographical proximity of religious services (a se-
rious problem during the Middle Ages) or laws requiring regular church attendance (a
common provision in the Reformation era) or influenced by the presence (or absence)
of nonreligious incentives, such as access to church schools or eligibility for religious
charity. Variations in religious participation also may reflect changes in thequality of
collective religiosityrather than the quantity of individual religiosity.Caeterus parabus,a
religion that sees ritual life and priestly intervention as asine qua nonof individual salva-
tion (e.g., Catholicism) is likely to generate higher levels of religious participation than
one which sees individual salvation as the result of individual faith (e.g., Lutheranism)