298 Jeff Manza and Nathan Wright
precludes a broader consideration of religious impacts on voting behavior in the newer
democracies in Eastern Europe, South America, and Asia. This should not be taken to
mean that the impact in those latter countries is modest. Quite the contrary: The spread
of democratization processes around the world (e.g., Markoff 1996) has frequently been
influenced by social movements rooted in churches (not least the civil rights movement
in the United States; see Morris 1984; more generally, see Smith 1996a); and in a
number of countries a government with direct or strong indirect ties to fundamen-
talist (or quasi-fundamentalist) religious organizations is in, or has recently been, in
office (the list of such countries would include Iran, Turkey, India, and Algeria). These
issues are explored more fully elsewhere (Arjomand 1993; Marty and Appleby 1993).
This chapter is in three parts. We begin with a discussion of the diverse ways in
which religion may influence political behavior, and how these differences may man-
ifest themselves in different polities. Part two examines, in some detail, the U.S. case,
where the most extensive social science research literature has developed, and it pro-
vides the case that can most easily be related to all of the analytical elements introduced
in part one of the chapter. Part three surveys the comparative evidence from Western
Europe, including the factors that strengthen or weaken the religious cleavage across
different national contexts.
HOW DOES RELIGION INFLUENCE VOTING BEHAVIOR?
Religion as a Social Cleavage: A General Model
Any enduring and significant social cleavage, whether based on class, race/ethnicity,
linguistic preference, region, gender, or religion, will find varying degrees of expression
in political conflicts at four distinct levels: (a) social structure; (b) group identity; (c) po-
litical organizations and party systems; and (d) public policy outcomes (cf. Coleman
1956; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Manza and Brooks 1999: Chapter 2).
“Social” cleavages are always grounded in the social structure of a given society. In
the case of religion, there is of course wide variation in the types of religious divisions
found in different countries. In some countries, a single denomination (the Catholic
Church in Italy, Ireland, or Belgium, the Anglican Church in Britain, the Lutheran
Church in Sweden, and so forth) has the allegiance of most citizens who claim a reli-
gious identity. Here the social basis for a cleavage lies in the division between devout or
practicing adherents versus secular or nominally affiliated church members. In other
countries, however, there is much greater competition between denominations or re-
ligious traditions with large memberships (e.g., Germany, the Netherlands, the United
States). Religion can, in such societies, provide a basis for social stratification and in-
equality, in which members of a “dominant” denomination have privileged access to
valued positions (e.g., in the long dominance of “WASP” denominations in the United
States).
The existence of group divisions at the level of social structure may not matter much
for political life unless these are mobilized in some fashion. Actors have to perceive
these divisions as meaningful and unequal (Ebersole 1960; Koch 1995). Religious group
identities reflect the degree to which religious differences, whether between competing
religious denominations or, alternatively, between citizens with and without religious
identities, come to be the basis for group consciousness. Here, the question is to what