The Politics of Humanity

result”.^43 The challenge of Hopgood’s argument is to ask whether there is any
better route to defining humanitarianism than a necessarily vague, but visceral,
notion of the “existential act” of saving a life.^44 His conclusions come close to David
Rieff’s: humanitarianism should scale down its ambition and stick to saving some
lives and providing some beds for the night.
This intervention goes to the heart of contextualising the notion of rescue
within humanitarianism, and consequently of defining the contours of humanitarian
action. On its own terms, Hopgood’s argument is difficult to rebut. One possibility,
from within the realm of practice, is suggested by Rony Brauman. We might accept
the consequentialist logic of varying sources of life-saving relief, such as armies or
corporations. But that does not necessarily mean we have to label the action
“humanitarian” and to locate it within the sphere of humanitarianism. It can be
valuable on moral grounds other than those described as humanitarian.^45
Brauman’s point makes a lot of sense in terms of trying to pin down operational
principles to run a consistent humanitarian practice. There may well be value to a
brand identity for humanitarianism based on consistent principles. But ultimately,
the distinction between humanitarian relief and relief provided by less consistent
actors cannot fully hold beyond the level of practice, if we see humanitarianism as a
wider context for the negotiation of a common humanity and attendant
requirements of human solidarity. In this negotiation, surely what is crucial is not
what professional dedicated humanitarians are willing to do, but precisely what
those who are not might be. Humanitarianism is as much about expanding the
latter category as the former. Humanitarianism teases out the minimal, as well as
rigorous maximalist understandings of our common humanity and what is required
to preserve or save it. For instance, part of the role of International Humanitarian
43
“Moral intention” is of course a somewhat ambiguous phrase, and is best read as relating
to motive. Orbinski, "Nobel Lecture". 44
In discussion with Hopgood at a number of workshops and conferences during the course
of 2009, he emphasised that, though he cannot set out a rigorous philosophical definition
of it, some kind of visceral, “existential act” of saving lives has to be at the heart of any
notion of humanitarian action. 45
Rony Brauman, "Masterclass: A Review of the Last Two Decades of Humanitarian
Assistance" ("Who are the Humanitarians Now?" Seminar, Humanitarian and Conflict
Response Institute, University of Manchester, 24 November 2009).