The Politics of Humanity

contribution to humanitarianism is not to be found in the particular acts of rescue
that may or may not have taken place that weekend, but rather in his foundational
role in creating an institution that would be there to save lives in the future.
But as the provision of life-saving action becomes more institutionalised,
something that could potentially be relied upon, it inevitably comes to relate back
to more preventive concerns, relating directly to the question posed by Mary
Anderson and evoked in the previous chapter: “you save my life today, but for what
tomorrow?”^3 Or, we might add, “why was I not protected yesterday”. Issues of
protection from harm, and protection after rescue, have also frequently been the
subject of institutionalisation. This type of impetus towards institutionalisation is far
more ambitious. It frequently draws on notions of human perfectibility, that
contingency can be escaped in a more profound sense. It suggests that we can learn
from and improve the world around us, and that much human suffering is
“avoidable” and can, with effective action, be avoided.
Suffering not avoided raises the question of accountability for suffering that
has occurred or will occur. In the previous chapter, it was suggested that even the
smallest acts of memorialisation or testimony can, in a sense, rescue a conceptual, if
not fully realisable in the obtaining circumstances, space for a “possibility of
humanity”. The struggle to create mechanisms of accountability represents an
amplification of this desire for recognition and justice, and in a sense demonstrates
a circular pattern (which can take the form of tautology in some humanitarians’
account of what they are engaged in). The hope is that in creating accountability for
suffering, future suffering will be pre-empted, abuses deterred. So though such
projects may appear remedial, they are also deeply preventive: they aim to
normalise “good” behaviour” that will not result in avoidable suffering.
Since its inception, professional humanitarianism has struggled over which
of these purposes should take priority, and over the extent to which the
contingencies of rescue can be overcome. But the partial successes
humanitarianism has achieved in enshrining them all has paradoxically led to
humanitarianism itself being the object of such humanitarian critiques. We saw in
3
Anderson, "'You Save My Life Today, but for What Tomorrow?'".