that determines how accountability is actualised.^24 In other words, professional
humanitarians become accountable to donors for the funds they receive. In many
cases, they are the agents to state principals in the delivery of assistance.^25 The
pursuit of accountability has, to a large extent, merely formalised its dependence on
contingent philanthropy, especially the philanthropy of states, rather than
rendering the provision of rescue non-contingent, or its exercise accountable. Vaux
confirms this: “[the] disadvantage of accountability is that it usually means
accountability to those outside, not to the person in need”.^26 This problem partly
stems from the way that institutionalisation often creates distance between rescuer
and rescued and fragments the former into a chain of different actors, precluding
the possibility of unidirectional accountability. The picture can be even more
complicated, as agreements or contracts with host governments can add a third
potential stakeholder to the mix.
The Red Cross Code of Conduct, signed by most of the major humanitarian
NGOs suggests that there need not be a problem: “We hold ourselves accountable
to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources”.^27 But
this formulation presents two revealing problems. Firstly, there is no reason why
accountability to both parties should always be possible. They can often pull in
different directions. As I argued in Chapter 3, there is no necessary match between
what donors want and the needs of recipients. On occasion, these might make
utterly incommensurate demands on humanitarian organisations.
Secondly, who is holding humanitarians to account? The Code’s formulation,
“We hold ourselves”, goes to the heart of the problem: to a large extent,
humanitarian accountability is a voluntary exercise that may condition action in the
desired direction but is difficult to punish in the breach.^28 In a curious sense, the
idea of a code of conduct takes professional humanitarians full circle. Having drawn
24
25 Wenar, "Accountability in International Development Aid": 16.
26 Stein, "Humanitarian Organizations", 127.
27 Vaux, The Selfish Altruist , 68.
28 IFRC, The Code of Conduct.
Though Wenar argues that such “horizontal” accountability mechanisms, if well-designed
can lead to concrete improvements. Wenar, "Accountability in International Development
Aid": 17-23.