The Politics of Humanity

plausible, let alone possible to implement in practice. Though they may not be, by
and large, overly-optimistic about solving the problem in practice, many assume
that the problem of justice is at least solvable in theory.^36 The argument I put
forward in Chapter 5 prompts three responses to this that suggest the advantages
of a broad humanitarian perspective over, say, a cosmopolitan justice perspective.
Firstly, there is a broad consensus that anthropogenic climate change
represents, on a number of different levels, a profound injustice, in ways directly
relevant to the generation of humanitarian concern. For instance, those least
causally responsible for it are almost certainly going to suffer its earliest effects, and
its worst effects in the longer term Moreover, the greatest costs are likely to be
borne largely by people who will not yet have been born during the crucial window
of opportunity for effective action. Secondly, due to the complexity of the “perfect
moral storm”, the achievement of an unassailable ideal theory of justice in relation
to climate change seems deeply implausible. Yet, if we recall Sen’s warning that
transcendental ideals of justice are not the best guides to making comparative
judgements between options on the table, we can do without such theories
perfectly well in making any action taken to mitigate the severity of the problem
less unjust. Thirdly, it would be, as Shklar suggests, equally delusional to think that
what mitigation efforts we will engage in will not create further humanitarian
injustices: there will be trade-offs that directly affect people’s welfare.
Furthermore, in working through the politics of climate change, the lessons
of Chapters 3, 4 and 6 are important. In terms of mobilising action, it was seen that
rather than try to convince people to become perfect altruists, a humanitarian
concern for climate change needs to speak to their sense of self and their complex
identities, if it is to gain political traction and become embedded in collective
identities and aspirations, notably as embodied by states. If there is any optimism to
be found in this perspective, it is that a large proportion of those with the most
excess emissions to shed live in broadly democratic states, and therefore the
opportunities for humanitarian politics are somewhat larger.
36
If one were to be uncharitable, one could say that solving the problem in theory is more
important to many international political theorists of climate change, than generating
concrete action.