automatically lead to a glorification of its cause, which is the suffering of
others.^21Through this kind of humanitarian concern, we come to define ourselves as those
who do not suffer, in contrast to the objects of that concern, who do. A
humanitarian impulse defined by pity necessarily sets in train a very different kind
of relationship, one clearly less egalitarian and solidaristic than a response born
from empathy. Boltanski expresses a preference for a “politics of justice”. Yet pity
cannot be excluded entirely from a plausible account of potential humanitarian
reactions, as it can still operate within a context of defending a notion of common
humanity. This relates to the humanitarian perspectives explored in the previous
chapter, which clearly expand the category of common humanity, but in doing so
impose hierarchies based on narratives of infantilisation or sexism, for instance. We
will see in subsequent chapters that feeling sorry for someone without identifying
with their suffering plays a major part in some of the excesses of humanitarian
action. If the identification and experience of shared humanity lies at the heart of
humanitarianism, then clearly an empathetic reaction to suffering is more
consistent with a coherent humanitarianism than a reaction of pity.
Yet a non-negotiable requirement of full empathy equally seems unfeasibly
daunting, and goes against the grain of humanitarianism as a largely practical
endeavour, as much characterised by action as by the concern that fuels it. It is not
clear that it is necessarily problematic if pity can raise the funds to send into the
field a professional humanitarian, perhaps one fuelled by a strongly empathetic
connection to the suffering he or she will encounter there. It is worth noting that in
his discussion of the principle of humanity, Jean Pictet chooses to emphasise the
role of pity, which “is one of the driving forces of charity. It is a spontaneous
movement, an instantaneous affective reaction to the suffering of others”.^22
Perhaps, then, the affective basis that is seen as sufficient for humanitarian action is
linked to the desired scope of humanitarian action. For an act of charity, pity might
be sufficient, while for a more sustained act, such as an act of justice, empathy
21
22 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin, 1990), 88-89.
Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross , unpaginated text.