Russians’ own beliefs in gender inequality but more
importantly because of their understanding of the
role Islam would play in this part of the empire.
Aware of the relationship between Islam and cul-
ture and the danger in directly challenging this
arrangement, the Russians established an unwritten
contract with the leaders of the Muslim republics to
allow them to maintain certain practices that were
based on cultural as well as religious traditions.
The non-interference agreement encompassed sev-
eral different elements, each reinforcing the patri-
archal social structure of the Muslim population.
One was the infusion of religious doctrine and law
into the daily activities of the Muslim population.
Because the center of social as well as religious
life of every city was the mosque, the religious lead-
ers, the ≠ulamà±, codified customs that they deemed
best for the society through religious decrees and
Islamic education, thereby religiously endorsing
attitudes toward women. By interpreting Islam in a
manner that supported their individual views on
women and the society as a whole, the ≠ulamà±pre-
vented any direct challenge to their authority,
because they invoked the Qur±àn and hence claimed
divine sanction. At times, however, religious inter-
pretations varied from republic to republic. In
Uzbekistan, for example, because the type of Islam
that was taught in schools reflected a more conser-
vative attitude toward women and this attitude was
transferred into the daily social practices of the
society, any form of contact between men and
women, outside of marriage, was virtually forbid-
den. In Kyrgyzstan, in contrast, Muslim women
exercised greater social freedom than their Uzbek
counterparts. Because of their society’s nomadic
nature and harsh climate, female participation was
essential in daily life. As a result, there was a more
liberal and less restrictive attitude toward women.
Kyrgyz women, for example, did not have to fast
during the month of Ramadan or pray five times a
day. However, despite these differences, the Kyrgyz
society was also one of patriarchy where men dic-
tated the moral behavior of the family. In addition
to Islamic education, the Russians permitted the
Sharì≠a to remain the guardian of law in the region,
even though the most serious crimes cases came
under the jurisdiction of Russian courts (Akiner
1986, 262). For example, in addition to the civil
office, the ≠ulamà±recorded birth, marriages, and
deaths of the population. The arrangement be-
tween the state and the ≠ulamà±allowed the Muslim
population not only to continue to preserve what
they believed to be their heritage but also to guard
against cultural practices that they may have
viewed as a threat to the existing social structure.
russian colonial domains of the caucasus and central asia 73
The other factor that helped to strengthen tradi-
tional attitudes toward women was the decision of
the Russians not to interfere in the patriarchal sys-
tem of the Muslim societies, in other words to leave
all the domains of the “home” untouched. Gov-
erned by a patriarch, who was expected to make all
the decisions, the Muslim family was a closely knit
institution, where membership was achieved by
birth, adoption, or marriage, and the line was pre-
served through the son. Within this system, the
patriarch defined the “moral” tone of the family,
particularly when it came to women. A Muslim
woman, regardless of her socioeconomic back-
ground, was required to behave in a manner that
was synonymous with her cultural surroundings.
She was, for example, to dress in a manner that rep-
resented her individual culture, religious beliefs,
and social status. In Uzbekistan social rules de-
manded very little contact between men and women.
They also compelled Uzbek women to dress in a
manner that was not that different from the men.
They wore long trousers and long shirts and cov-
ered themselves with a long gown and a heavy
black veil. The reason for the veil was not so much
religion as social protection. Because certain Mus-
lim women had broken with traditional practices,
either by divorcing or wearing Russian style cloth-
ing, they were perceived as “immoral.” So, in order
to protect herself from charges of immorality, an
Uzbek woman covered her head with a veil.
But by the beginning of the twentieth century
some of the Islamic communities, perhaps influ-
enced by Russia’s social habits, began to allow
greater social rights for women. The upper and
middle classes of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, for
example, allowed girls to go to school and to obtain
an education. In several parts of the region female
poets began to publish their work and became well-
known literary figures. In Azerbaijan, the first all
girls’ schools were opened in the early 1900s. Yet,
despite these opportunities, the social environment
of the majority of Muslim women remained largely
the same because the changes were targeted toward
the small urban upper elite.
During the Russian occupation the women of
Central Asia and the Caucusus lived in an environ-
ment where ancient cultural attitudes combined
with religious doctrine dictated their social behav-
ior. Partly fueled by an attempt to maintain their
heritage and partly because of personal beliefs, the
various peoples who made up the Russian Islamic
republics, supported at times by women, advocated
values that not only represented their past but also
marked their future. These values would continue
to be in practice even during the Soviet era, where