tions of equality. Concerning gender, most Muslim
societies use a mixture of Islamic contexts and
interpretation of Islamic texts (Qur±àn and ™adìth),
pre-Islamic culture, tradition, custom, and the in-
terests of those who hold the reigns of power
(Shamina 1997, Creevey 1996).
Islamic communities in Sub-Saharan Africa have
had to deal with non-Muslim members within their
own cultural regions, which has sometimes caused
them to draw boundaries and define interactions
between “us” and “them.” This may lead to con-
frontations, but can also bring about constructive
cooperation and mutual interdependence between
communities with national or state policies that are
reflected in the political structures and constitu-
tions. Even in regions where Muslims are a major-
ity there are often groups, sometimes of a
fundamentalist nature, who consider themselves to
be good believers and consider other Muslims to
have an inadequate understanding of Islamic faith
and principles, and who therefore try to convert
or reconvert their population. Such is the case,
for example, in Sudan, where the regime has taken
on increasingly Islamic course, although its consti-
tution acknowledges the right to equality (art. 21)
and freedom of religion (art. 24). As sources of the
Sudanese constitution include Islamic law, referen-
dums, the constitution itself, and custom, the per-
sonal status of women is subject to the relevant
provisions of the Qur±àn (Bantekas and Abu-Sabeib
2000, 540). In North Cameroon Islamic purifying
movements are also active, but they place strong
emphasis on education for women and a larger role
for them in the public and political space, which the
national constitution provides for but which tradi-
tional pre-Islamic society often denies.
In some African countries national constitutions
disfavor equal gender relations and need to be
brought into accord with Islamic law and constitu-
tion to favor women’s position; in other countries
the contrary is the case. In Nigeria, famous for the
Sharì≠a court death sentence by stoning prescribed
for women accused of adultery, the 1999 con-
stitution, Section 6/1 vests judicial power in the fed-
eration of diverse lower courts. However, final
appeal can be made in the Nigerian states’ Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court (Essien 2000).
Some governments deal with the differences be-
tween their Islamic and non-Islamic populations
explicitly; for example, in Mauritania the constitu-
tion adopts Islam as a state religion but application
of Islamic laws depends on the conditions given by
state laws (Monteillet 2002). Other nation-states
do not mention the discrepancies of Islamic law in
relation to the state. In Uganda, for example, a new
sub-saharan africa 85constitution was enacted in 1995 in which most of
the critical provisions concerning both Muslim and
non-Muslim women were accepted. These provi-
sions were enacted after an enormous struggle on
the part of women’s groups to have a female repre-
sentative from each of the 39 districts on the Con-
stitutional Commission (Matembe 2002, 196–7).
In South Africa an entire chapter of the new con-
stitution of 1996 was dedicated to institutions
supporting constitutional democracy, such as the
Human Rights and Gender Equality Commission
(Ebrahim 1998).
The constitutions of certain countries, such as
Senegal and Mali, are based on former colonial
constitutions, rendering them secular republics with
a governmental structure adapted from the French
colonizers and modified to suit national needs
(Creevey 1996, Clark 1999). In other countries new
constitutions were adopted after a process of demo-
cratization and the preceding national conferences.
Chad, for example, a country with a large Islamic
population which has long been divided by internal
wars, adopted a new constitution in 1996 (Lanne
1996) that mentions equality of the sexes in article 6.
In Sub-Saharan Africa constitutional provisions
against gender discrimination are reinforced by the
obligation assumed by different states as signatories
to the United Nations Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) and the African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights. Article 18(3) of CEDAW explicitly
states: “The state shall ensure the elimination of
every discrimination against women and ensure the
protection of the rights of women and the child as
stipulated in the Universal Declarations conven-
tions” (Mugwanya 2000, 761, Ibhawoh 1996, 46).
However, as Mugwanya argues for Uganda, many
states urgently need to reform their legal systems, as
well as those practices and customs in both public
and private spheres that are antithetical to the
rights and dignity of women. Female genital muti-
lation (FGM) is an example. CEDAW and the
United Nations’ Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action on Women’s Rights recognized FGM as
a form of violence against women. Its practice is
unambiguously forbidden in some state constitu-
tions, such as Burkina Faso, where practitioners
have been prosecuted in connection with the death
of young girls (Ibhawoh 1999, 70). In other coun-
tries, however, such as Sudan, attempts to enforce
legislation against FGM have caused popular out-
cries and have been abandoned. In 1990 the gov-
ernment of Kenya announced that it had officially
banned FGM, but no law was passed in parlia-
ment to prohibit it. The Nigerian constitution is in