they had left their land and with whom they had
kept up intimate relations. Poor women in town
who were cut off from the support of their families
or without land rights in their villages of origin had
no means to request a separation (Maher 1974a,
191–221, 1974b).
Marital discord is generally attributed to the
wife’s disobedience or disagreeable character. Among
the Moroccan poor the discrepancy between the
legal model of men as the sole providers and the
social reality of the wife being in many cases
the main breadwinner is an important underlying
reason for marital breakdown. A common way for
unemployed men to respond to the dishonor of
being dependent on their wife’s work or network, is
to reclaim authority by violence or by deserting the
family (Mir-Hosseini 2000, 120–1).
Divorce
In the divorce process, women have fewer rights
than men. The dominant form of divorce in Islam
is the †alàq, whereby a man simply declares: “I
repudiate thee.” When he does so three times the
divorce becomes irrevocable. He need not give a
reason, nor need his wife be present or informed.
This superior male right dominates the general dis-
course on divorce. It is expressed by the use of the
passive form (“he has repudiated her” rather than
“they separated”) in stories of men randomly
divorcing their wives and in male threats during
conflicts. This discourse fuels women’s fear of
divorce more than actual knowledge of divorce
rates; accurate statistics on this issue are remark-
ably absent or unreliable in most Arab countries.
Most Arab states have limited excessive use of this
male prerogative. Many now require registration of
the †alàqby a notary, and consider repudiations
made under certain circumstances invalid, for
example, when the husband is intoxicated or in a fit
of anger or violence, or pronounces a triple repudi-
ation in one formula, or when the wife is menstru-
ating. In Egypt since 1979 the wife must be
informed of the action and is entitled to remain in
the rented marital home when she assumes custody
of the children (Rugh 1984, 179). In Tunisia a
divorce can only be obtained in court.
Despite such adaptations, women remain disad-
vantaged in terms of divorce. Simple registration
does not suffice, and women must request divorce
through a court. Nearly all divorce cases treated in
court are therefore instigated by women, although
men initiate divorce twice as often as women (Mir-
Hosseini 2000, 84–5, Rugh 1984, 177). Unlike
men, women need to have good reasons to petition
for divorce, such as the husband’s impotence or
arab states 99suffering from a dangerous contagious disease,
repeated and extreme violent abuse, failure to pro-
vide maintenance, or desertion.
An alternative for women to effect separation is
to convince the husband to divorce her. In this khul≠
divorce by mutual consent, the wife must pay the
husband compensation for agreeing to release her:
she “buys her head” as people say in the Maghrib.
It should not be seen, however, as a “woman’s
divorce” in which women have equal rights. Men
can abuse this option to avoid paying divorce dues.
Rather than pronouncing a †alàqa man can make
his wife’s life so miserable that she leaves him and
pays for a khul≠divorce. Moreover, he can make
her pay dearly for her freedom. She commonly has
to return the mahrand to relinquish her right to the
deferred mahr, but often she also gives up her main-
tenance during the waiting period (≠idda), the main-
tenance of the children, or even the right to custody.
A woman thus has to give up the very property that
was meant to protect her against divorce and its
financial consequences. Lower-class women with-
out economic means or familial support will there-
fore seldom request a khul≠. Instead, they fight to
retain their mahrand maintenance. It is mainly
women from upper and middle strata of society
who request a khul≠divorce in court. Since 2000,
Egyptian women can do so without the husband’s
agreement. By exploiting the possibilities of khul≠
to the full, they can gain more gender equality in
access to divorce. But they still bear the brunt of its
consequences: the required arbitration process
reinforces the extant familial control over divorce
arrangements, women must return the mahrand
other gifts, and stand up to public opinion, which
condemns khul≠as disrespectable (Tucker 2003).
Several women’s organizations take a stand
against gender discriminatory family laws and court
practices or provide concrete support to divorcees
(Collectif 95 1995). Divorce rates are likely to
increase with the growing participation of women
in the labor market and in politics. Christians in
Islamic countries divorce less often than Muslims.
The divorce rules of their churches vary from a
total ban on divorce to allowing it under specific
circumstances. Christian women have less fear of
divorce and no protection in the form of a deferred
mahr. Occasionally, a Christian who wants to di-
vorce becomes Muslim or, more commonly, converts
to another Christian denomination that accepts
divorce.After divorce
A divorced woman is expected to return to her
family of birth and then remarry. A women’s impetus