military offensive, demonstrated the failure of the
Pahlavìmonarchy to integrate non-Persian women
into the unitary ethnicist state. In fact, Kurdish
nationalists created their own alternative, a Kurd-
ish state based on Kurdish ethnicity, with its lan-
guage, culture, history, homeland (niçtman), in
other words Kurdistan, with its own ideal “Kurd-
ish woman.” This Kurdish woman shared more
with the women envisioned by the Kurdish nation-
alists of the late Ottoman period than the modern
“Iranian women” fostered by the Pahlavìstate
(Mojab 2001b).
Participants in the 1978–9 Revolution against
the monarchy were extremely diverse socially and
politically, and pursued different goals. In Kur-
distan, the struggle was predominantly nationalist
and secular, and the demand was autonomy within
a democratic and federal state structure. Even the
two Kurdish Islamic leaders who came to promi-
nence in 1978–80 called for self-rule. The Islamic
theocracy is, like the monarchical regime, a unitary
state rooted in Persian ethnicity (its language, reli-
gion, and culture), and rejects the idea of autonomy
for non-Persian nationalities. “Muslim women”
were given a special role in the Islamization of the
ancient monarchical state; they were expected to
play a leading role in reversing the social and cul-
tural changes that had occurred in Iran since the
constitutional revolution. In Kurdistan, resistance
against the Islamization of gender relations assumed
a nationalist dimension, although religious cleav-
ages were present (most Kurds are Sunnìs while the
Iranian theocracy is Shì≠ì). Resistance included,
among others, using Kurdish, non-Islamic, female
names, and violating Islamic dress codes by wear-
ing Kurdish clothing, and participating in wed-
dings, which are centered on mixed dances and
music.
Kurdish opposition parties engaged in armed
resistance when the army launched a major offen-
sive, in August 1979, to wipe out the autonomy
movement. One of the political organizations,
Komele, the Kurdistan organization of the Com-
munist Party of Iran, and other leftist groups
recruited hundreds of women into their military
and political ranks. Komele’s military camps formed
a sharp contrast to the gender apartheid regime
imposed throughout Iran. The organization abol-
ished gender segregation, and women participated
in traditionally male domains such as combat and
military/political training, while men undertook
traditionally female work such as cooking, wash-
ing, and cleaning.
By 2000, the Islamization of gender relations had
failed in Kurdistan, where the active presence of
overview 363“Kurdish woman” was in sharp contrast with the
contested, state-sponsored, “Muslim woman.” While
a considerable number of Kurdish women had
entered the non-domestic labor force, both skilled
and unskilled, an increasing number of poets (for
example, Miryam Hula and Zhila Huseini), writers
(for example, Nasrin Ja≠fari and N. J. Ashna),
musicians (for example, Qashang Kamkar), teach-
ers, and artists pointed to the formation of an intel-
ligentsia. At the same time, the unprecedented
increase in women’s suicide, especially through
self-immolation, revealed the pressures of both
theocratic patriarchy and domestic violence (Yùsifì
and Yùsifì1997), all exacerbated by the wars of the
1980s, poverty, and a ruined economy.iraq
Formed under British occupation (1917–20) and
mandate (1920–32) supervised by the League of
Nations, the Iraqi state accepted the existence of
the Kurds as a people with limited rights to use
their language in primary schools, publishing, and
broadcasting. However, Britain rejected Kurdish
demands for autonomous status within a federal
Iraqi state, fearing that it would spread Kurdish
nationalism to the neighboring countries, and
inhibit the integration of the Kurds. Unlike the
nationalist regimes of Turkey and Iran, Britain did
not adopt “state feminism” in the course of build-
ing Iraq as a monarchical Arab state. In fact, British
authorities complained to the League of Nations
about incessant Kurdish educational demands
(Great Britain 1930, 139–40), including more girls’
schools. The monarchical regime (1932–58) con-
tinued the policy of ignoring gender equality. The
Communist Party of Iraq, like its counterparts in
Iran, Syria, and Turkey, was vocal in advocating
women’s rights.
Resisting assimilation into the Arab state, Kurdish
nationalists emphasized their ethnic, linguistic, cul-
tural, territorial, racial, and historical distinctness,
which included the claim to the relative freedom of
Kurdish women. However, the autonomous gov-
ernment of Sheikh Mahmoud formed in the early
1920s was a patriarchal, feudal regime with no
interest in women’s rights. Still, intellectuals, rang-
ing from religious to nationalist to Communist,
denounced the oppression of women. The most
prominent modern poet, Abdullah Goran (1904–62),
condemned, in his poetry, gender and class violence,
especially honor killing. The KDP of Iraq published,
clandestinely, the first issue of Dengî Afret(Woman’s
voice) in 1953.
In the more or less open environment following
the overthrow of monarchy in 1958, the Communist