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E. Ural, Handbook of Turkish law for foreigners, Ankara
1991.Irina BabichIranFrom the Safavid period (1501–1722) Iran has
been a Shì≠ìcountry and its law is based on the rules
of the Twelver Shì≠a. Shì≠ìfamily law differs only in
some minor points from Sunnìlaw, for example, in
the pronunciation of the phrase of repudiation by
the husband, the right of male and female lines to
inheritance after the distribution of the property as
prescribed by the Qur±àn, and the validity of the so-
called temporary marriage (mut≠a, Persian ßìgha,
izdivàj-i muvaqqat).
In the nineteenth century legislation and juris-
diction were mainly influenced by the rules of
the Sharì≠a, which were applied inshar≠ìcourts
presided over by religious scholars, and by custom-
ary law (≠urf). In his wish to create a modern nation
state with a secular judicial system based on mod-
ern legal codes, Reza Shah Pahlavì(r. 1926–41)
abolished the religious courts and reduced the
influence of the Sharì≠a. Family law was codified
between 1928 and 1935 as part of the Iranian Civil
Code. In 1967 Mohammad Reza Shah (r. 1941–79)
enacted the Family Protection Law, which was
regarded at that time as one of the most modern
family laws in the Islamic world. It was amended in- However, as family law and the law of inher-
itance have always been regarded as central to the
Sharì≠a, even in this Family Protection Law equality
between the sexes was not achieved; rather, certain
discriminatory rules such as men’s right to arbitrary
divorce, polygamy, and child custody were re-
stricted. The woman was given permission to initi-
ate divorce if her husband took another wife
without her consent. Secularization of marriage
and divorce was introduced through submission to
the control of a family protection court. Divorce
was possible only after reconciliation had failed.
The responsibility for reaching agreement on main-
tenance and custody of children was placed on the
couple. The court only intervened when agreement
was not reached. The age of marriage was raised to
20 for men and 18 for women.
Despite its Sharì≠a origin, this law provoked a
392 law: articulation of islamic and non-islamic systems
strong protest amongst the clergy. The Shì≠ìclergy
and especially the late leader of the Islamic Revo-
lution, Khomeini, sharply criticized this law as con-
trary to Islamic law. In the Islamic Republic (1979)
most of the stipulations of the Family Protection
Law were revoked. Among others, the marriage age
of girls was reduced to nine years. The Islamic state
encouraged a proliferation of the practice of ßìgha
(second temporary marriage to the same man).
However, this return to unrestricted Sharì≠a rules
proved to be socially and politically unacceptable.
A legal discourse, especially among women, the
clergy, and responsible state officials emerged in the
following period. In 1992 a law was enacted that
(as in 1967) outlawed divorces without a court cer-
tificate and required the registering of marriages.
Female legal advisors were admitted at the family
courts and the rights given to women in 1967 were
reintroduced, this time legitimated on the basis of
Islamic law. At the beginning of the twenty-first
century the family law of the Islamic Republic did
not differ substantially from the Shah’s 1967
Family Protection Law.
Since the late 1990s the discourse on women’s
rights in Iran has been increasingly dominated by
female voices. This discourse is shaped by the influ-
ence of different systems of law, especially the influ-
ence of modern Western law and the human rights
discussion, but also by the obvious flexibility of the
Sharì≠a rules. Interpretation of Sharì≠a rules, espe-
cially in matters of family law, is currently the sub-
ject of an ongoing public legal discourse.
Legal pluralism, the coexistence of different legal
codes or legal cultural practices, for example, cus-
tomary law and – more importantly – European
law beside Islamic law, has further influenced legal
reasoning of women. Nomadic customary law
affected the position of women in nomadic societies
before their gradual decline since the early twenti-
eth century. Religious groups such as Christians
(mostly Armenians) and Jews have their own legal
systems concerning personal statute, which some-
times provides women with better legal or social
conditions, allowing more political participation
and a reduction of segregation.
The Islamic Republic of Iran propagated a con-
cept of gender in accordance with Islamic law,
favoring complementarity as opposed to equality of
sexes. The Islamic Republic thus tried to create its
own blueprint of the position of women in a mod-
ern society. However, in the face of the existing legal
inequality of sexes in family law, women of differ-
ent social, religious, and political backgrounds in
Iran formed a movement to demand improvement
in their legal position. These demands are for-