of divorce the laws of purity are disregarded and
the repudiation is made irrevocable by a three-fold
pronouncement by the husband in a single meeting.
When he says to his wife, “I divorce you” three
times she becomes prohibited from him until she
remarries and consummates the second marriage.
After this second marriage is terminated, she can
remarry her first husband once the waiting period
has elapsed. The triple †alàqis irrevocable and thus
does not afford the opportunity for reconciliation.
Although the †alàq al-bid≠a is condemned as repre-
hensible, this form of divorce is accepted by all the
four Sunnìschools and is still practiced in many
countries.
The perilous position of women in divorce mat-
ters can be further discerned from the fact that the
£anafìs, Màlikìs, and Shàfi≠ìs consider a divorce
recited by mistake or in jest or under intoxication
to be valid. The £anbalìs, however, do not consider
such a divorce valid.
In recent times, reforms have been enacted in var-
ious countries to control the husband’s unilateral
right of repudiation. The Syrian Law of Personal
Status of 1953, for example, stipulates that the
triple †alàq is to count as a single repudiation so as
to allow the couple an opportunity to reconcile.
The law also requires the husband to pay compen-
sation to the wife if the court deems that he
divorced her without reasonable cause. Tunisia
refuses to recognize any divorce effected outside
the judicial process. The Tunisian Law of 1957 also
prohibits polygyny, a practice that is endorsed by
the Qur±àn provided the wives are treated equally.
To prevent abuse of the system, the Iraqi law of
1959 requires a polygamous marriage to be vali-
dated by the court.
The impingement of cultural factors engendered
significant differences in other juridical opinions
that emerged in the different schools. All the
schools agree that maintenance is obligatory during
the waiting period of a revocable divorce. The
schools differed, however, on maintenance during
the ≠idda(waiting period) of an irrevocable divorce.
The £anafìs were more favorable to the women,
stating that the rules of maintenance during the
≠iddaof a revocable divorce were also applicable
for an irrevocable divorce. The other schools dif-
ferentiated based on whether she was pregnant or
not. Unless she was pregnant, the wife in Medina
was entitled to receive only lodging in her hus-
band’s home during the ≠idda.
Under Islamic law, the wife has limited options to
initiate divorce proceedings. Her right is encapsu-
lated in the khul≠(by the instigation of the wife)
form of divorce. Since the Qur±àn recognizes khul≠
overview 443(2:229), it is accepted by all the legal schools.
However, it can be finalized only with the hus-
band’s consent. For khul≠to be valid the wife has to
petition for divorce and is also required to offer
some form of compensation to the husband (such
as the return of the mahr). Khul≠operates as a sin-
gle, irrevocable divorce with an ≠iddaincumbent on
the wife. Contrary to £anafìlaw, the Màlikìs rec-
ognized the validity of a khul≠divorce even without
the consent of the husband.
Other differences between the schools occur in
the laws pertaining to the judicial rights of a
woman to seek divorce. Abù£anìfa refused a judi-
cial divorce unless the husband was impotent or
had other personal defects. Thus factors such as the
failure to provide maintenance, intermittent ab-
sence, continuous physical abuse, or life imprison-
ment do not provide grounds for a judge to dissolve
the marriage because divorce is seen as the hus-
band’s prerogative.
In this instance, Màlikìlaw accords more rights
to the woman. She can ask for a divorce due to the
husband’s desertion, failure to maintain her, cru-
elty, sexual impotence, or chronic disease. Màlikì
law also recognized judicial divorce on the grounds
of a husband’s injurious treatment of his wife. It
went further, stating that if the differences were
irreconcilable, the court may finalize the divorce
even without the husband’s consent. The other
schools of law allow a woman to demand †alàq on
certain grounds, for example, not providing main-
tenance, physical abuse, or prolonged imprison-
ment leading to hardship for the wife. Syria, which
normally follows £anafìlaw, in 1953 adopted
the more liberal Màlikìlaw, which states that the
wife may petition for divorce on such grounds as
the husband’s cruelty, desertion, or failure to main-
tain her.
Differences between the schools also arose over
the question of a missing husband. Màlikìlaw was
more favorable to women in this instance. Màlik
held that the wife of a missing husband may seek
judicial separation after a four-year waiting period.
If he does not reappear within this time, she will
observe the ≠iddaof a widow and is then free to
remarry. The £anafìs, Shàfi≠ìs, and £anbalìs, in
contrast, state that the wife of a missing husband
may not remarry as long as he may be considered
alive based on the average life span of a person. The
£anafìs fix this at 120 years, the Shàfi≠ìs and
£anbalìs at 90 years. Such laws reflect the patrilin-
eal character and male dominance of eighth- and
ninth-century Arabian society when many of the
juridical rulings were formulated.