tations, comprised part of the family law that was
applied by Muslim jurists.
Islamic law was adamant that the mahrwas the
sole property of the bride; the repeated insistence of
jurists on this point in legal texts indicates that it
was not unusual for self-interested guardians to
take the mahrfor themselves. Another issue fre-
quently discussed by the jurists is the attempt of
some men to avoid paying the mahrby agreeing
with another family to “exchange” brides between
the families, with neither bride getting a mahr. This
practice, known as shighàr, was explicitly prohib-
ited by the Prophet, but seems to have continued as
a cultural practice among the Beduin in particular
(even until modern times, when Beduin women
sought the judgment of Sharì≠a courts to secure
their Islamic rights over customary practices; see
Shaham 1993).
Unlike in many medieval Mediterranean and
Asian societies, the family of the bride was not
required to pay the husband a dowry. In some soci-
eties, however, it was customary for a bride to bring
a trousseau (jahàz) with her to her husband’s
home. Consisting normally of bedding, furnish-
ings, jewelry and clothes, the jahàzwas legally the
property of the bride, unless some of it had only
been lent to her by her family for a time. Legal texts
indicate that some men tried to claim part of their
wife’s trousseau upon divorce, a claim that was
supported by custom in some places, but rejected
by Islamic law (Tucker 1998, 54–5).
If a man desired to divorce his wife (†alàq), he
was forbidden to take back the mahror any of the
gifts he had given her. It was customary in some
communities for couples to split the mahrinto
two amounts: prompt (muqaddam) and deferred
(mu±akhkhar). The prompt mahrwas paid at the
time of marriage, the deferred mahrwas considered
a debt against the husband’s estate if he died, or
which he had to pay if he divorced his wife. In addi-
tion, some scholars, particularly Màlikìscholars,
interpreted Qur±àn 2:236 to indicate that the judge
could require the husband to pay alimony (matà≠)
to his ex-wife.
In classical Islamic law, the husband can exercise
his right of divorce without resort to the court. Once
the husband utters a statement of divorce, his wife
enters a “waiting period” (≠idda) of three months (or
menstrual periods), or until delivery of a child if the
wife is pregnant. During this time, the couple should
live together without having sexual relations. If sex-
ual relations are resumed before the end of the ≠idda,
or if the husband tells his wife he wants her back as
his wife, the marriage is resumed. If no such action
is taken during the waiting period, the couple are
overview 455divorced. If a couple have twice divorced and re-
married, a third marriage is forbidden to them
unless the woman consummates a marriage with
another man. These regulations are intended to
deter men from using divorce as a threat and tool of
manipulation over women, which seems to have
been common in some societies.
Judges have the power to grant a divorce to
women for a number of reasons, including abuse,
neglect of duty, lack of support, and impotence.
Jurists gave a rather wide variety of interpretations
of the husband’s duties and the wife’s rights. For
example, some said that the wife had a right to reg-
ular sexual intercourse, so that impotence for any
extended period was grounds for divorce, while the
£anafìschool required only that the husband was
able to consummate the marriage. With a judicial
dissolution of marriage (faskh), the wife had the
right to retain her full mahrand all her marriage
gifts, or to receive the remainder of her mahrif she
had not been fully paid at the time of marriage.
A third means to dissolve a marriage is “divest-
ment” (khul≠) by the wife. In this case, the woman
does not claim any neglect or abuse by the husband,
but still desires to end the marriage. Some scholars
considered this process a kind of divorce, others
classified it as “ransoming.” The difference is
important, because those scholars who consider
khul≠to be a divorce conclude that it has legal effect
only if accepted by the husband. In contrast, those
scholars who consider khul≠a ransom permit the
wife to end the marriage without the agreement of
the husband, simply by returning to him the mahr
and any other marriage gifts.
Marriage contracts could be used to provide a
woman with stronger legal instruments for secur-
ing a divorce against the wishes of her husband.
Basic contracts recorded the necessary components
of the marriage process, such as the names of the
parties, that each consented to the union, and the
amount of the mahr. In addition, Shì≠ìjurists, in
contrast to Sunnìs, permitted the contract (written
or oral) to limit the duration of the marriage. Sunnì
jurists claimed a consensus that “temporary mar-
riage” (zawàj mut≠a) had been prohibited by the
Prophet Mu™ammad.
Marriage contracts seem to have been especially
important, however, for recording stipulations made
by the bride. The inclusion in early legal texts of
sample marriage contracts with a variety of possi-
ble stipulations indicates that the practice was rela-
tively widespread. Documentary evidence indicates
that stipulations continued to be an important part
of marriage contracts throughout the classical
period (Abdal-Rehim 1996, 98–103, Spectorsky