According to the Ja≠farìs, in the event of divorce,
the mother loses her children once boys reach age
seven and girls age nine. The £anbalìs set the age at
seven for both. For £anafìs the mother’s custody
ends when a boy is able to feed, clothe, and cleanse
himself and when a girl attains puberty. Shàfi≠ìs
require that both sexes reach the age of discretion
and are able to make decisions. Màlikìs are the
most lenient for mothers and allow a boy stay with
his mother until puberty and a girl until she mar-
ries. The Yemeni law sets ages nine and twelve
unless the judge decides differently (Article 139).
However, in cases of charges of immorality, the
mother loses her children once they are five (Article
144).
According to the classical schools, the widow is
entitled to inherit from her deceased husband after
paying funeral expenses, maintenance costs during
her ≠idda, and debts. All schools agree on the inher-
itance share allotted to the widow (one fourth), but
Sunnìs and Shì≠ìs differ on the meaning of a child
which reduces that share to one eighth. For Sunnìs,
a child must be related to the deceased without a
female link while Ja≠farìs maintain that every child
is a descendant. The Yemeni law applies the Sunnì
interpretation (Article 307).
Even though it is generally asserted that in the
absence of codified law women gaining justice in
court depends on the judge, in countries with a
code, such as Yemen, the role of the judge is also
crucial. Out of the countries discussed here, the
PDRY is the only state that has allowed women to
act as judges (see Figure 1).
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negotiate, in Islamic Law and Society2:3 (1995),
320–40.Susanne DahlgrenIranIn the domain of modern family law, the changes
that have occurred in Iran do not suggest a pro-
gressive expansion of women’s rights based on a
move from tradition to modernity. Rather the
changes have fluctuated, at times in opposing direc-
tions, depending on the policies and ideological ori-
entations of the men in control of the government.
Although the roots of the modern legislative
process in Iran can be traced to the aftermath of the
Constitutional Revolution of 1905–11, modern
legislation in the area of family law did not materi-
alize until 1967. Before this date, in keeping with
the long-standing practices of the Ja≠farìschool of
jurisprudence, the position of women within the
sphere of family remained precarious. A new Civil
Code in 1931 gave women the right to ask for
divorce under certain conditions, and the marriage
age was raised to 15 years for girls and 18 years for
boys. But the Civil Code was secular and family
laws remained within the domain of Islamic juris-
prudence. For instance, a husband could divorce
his wife at will by simply submitting a short letter
of intent to be notarized for record. The wife was
not required to be present and the husband unilat-
erally decided on the nature and extent of his finan-
cial obligations, if any, after divorce.
Major changes were introduced in the area of
family law with the passage of the Family Protec-
tion Law of 1967 (significantly amended in 1975).
This law did not redress the unequal status of
women under Islamic inheritance laws, which con-
tinue to be in effect until today. However, it did
abolish extra-judicial divorce, and required judicial
permission for polygyny and only under limited cir-
cumstances after the first wife’s consent was given.
It also established Special Family Courts for the
application of the new personal status legislation.
Minimum age of marriage for girls was raised to 18
years old. The establishment of the family courts, in
particular, was significant in so far as they created
an arena in which judges, lawyers, and interested
organizations could see and dwell on the family
problems that existed in the society and propose
important amendments to the law that came into
effect in 1975.