which empowers the male alone to dissolve a mar-
riage unilaterally and extra-judicially. In contrast,
the wife has only two options: to dissolve the mar-
riage by way of a delegated †alàq (†alàq al-tafwì∂),
which is usually embedded in a prenuptial agree-
ment, or by way of khul≠. In many Muslim coun-
tries today, the couple need simply check a box to
empower the wife also to unilaterally institute
a delegated divorce. Women outside the Islamic
world, however, have no legal means to implement
such prenuptial clauses and sometimes find them-
selves in what scholars term a limping marriage. In
this case they do obtain civil divorces from a secu-
lar court but remain married to husbands who
often, out of malice, withhold the †alàq pronounce-
ments, and deny their otherwise divorced wives the
right to remarry according to Islamic rites. This is
particularly true of women in countries such as the
United States where extra-judicial repudiations are
void and where no authority exists to coerce the
husband to institute an Islamic †alàq. Furthermore,
†alàqs obtained overseas have not fared well in
United States courts: in a recent ruling the courts
deemed such repudiations unenforceable because
of irreconcilable differences, both substantive and
procedural, between †alàq and a civil divorce (Seth
v. Seth, 694 S.W. 2d 459, 463 [Tex. Ct. App.
1985]). The courts have also refused to enforce
financial settlements ensuing from repudiations
procured within the United States but through an
arbitration process based on Islamic law; this, the
court ruled, would be in violation of the First
Amendment prohibition against undue entangle-
ment. The wife in classical Islamic law, and under
modern legislation in some Muslim countries, has
the right to dissolve the marriage through khul≠. In
this case she petitions her husband directly, or
through the state, or, where no such authority
exists, through the local religious authorities, to
dissolve the marriage in return for a financial pay-
ment, usually equal to her mahrpayment. Once
again, the undue entanglement clause as inter-
preted currently denies her this relief within the
United States. The conversion of spouses to Islam
has also created its own set of challenges to Islamic
law. According to classical Islamic law Muslim
women may not marry, or remain married to, part-
ners who belong to other faiths, which of course
means that on conversion the wife’s marital rela-
tionship is put in jeopardy. Some jurists have now
ruled in favor of upholding the marriages of such474 law: modern family law, 1800–present
female converts; but even this small minority has
yet to rule in favor of recognizing the civil contracts
of Muslim females who marry outside Islam.
In mitigation of the husband’s unfettered right to
divorce, and the potential cause of financial harm
to his wife, Islamic law allows the inclusion of a
mahrclause in a prenuptial contract. Such clauses
routinely split the mahrinto a cash portion, due
immediately, and a deferred portion due on de-
mand, or on dissolution of the marriage. Additional
rules govern marriages not consummated and mahr
not specified: in the first case the mahramount is
halved, and in the second, a suitable gift is substi-
tuted instead. The United States courts have refused
to enforce deferred mahr, however, on the basis that
a prenuptial clause allowing a spouse to profit from
a divorce is contrary to public policy, and thus
unenforceable (in re Marriage of Dajani, No.
G004356, Court of Appeal of California, Fourth
Appellate District, Division Three, 204 Cal. App.
3d 1387; 251 Cal. Rptr. 871; [Cal. Ct. App. 1988]).
But they have also considered mahragreements
enforceable on the basis that they are property
waivers that supersede the laws of alimony or the
laws governing the equitable distribution of the
marital estate. And the California Courts of Appeal
have enforced mahragreements based on the neu-
tral principles of contract law (in re Marriage of
Noghrey [1985] 169 Cal.App.3d 326 [215 Cal.
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