the abuse of the religious terrain as a result of local
democratic deficits, global economic trends, and
the subsequent utilization of women as a vehicle to
express supremacy in turbulent times. An addi-
tional challenge is the inability of many political
actors to distinguish between the various forms of
religious engagement in the contemporary polity.
Were such distinctions as those mentioned earlier
made, and if the assumption that fundamentalist
movements invariably result in the restriction of
women’s rights be questioned, there would be
important opportunities for strategic alliances to be
formed which could address pressing social, politi-
cal, and economic concerns, while empowering sig-
nificant sectors of the population.
Success stories have emerged through the real-
ization by some activists that, regardless of their
own personal convictions and/or feelings about
religion, it continues to play an important role in
the average person’s life. One of the critiques most
frequently leveled against secular women activists
is their lack of knowledge of the religious texts,
which can be a major hindrance in the process
of arguing for certain kinds of social change.
Qualified women scholars and activists now form a
significant element of the women’s movements,
providing important advice and argumentation
when necessary.
It is also becoming increasingly more evident
(even palatable) to many women activists that to
bring about social change, it is important to involve
all actors in society, including men, but especially
religious leaders. The experiences of Egyptianmoth-
ers married to non-Egyptian men, and those of
Moroccan women in favorably amending their per-
sonal status/family laws, point to the importance of
mobilizing the male constituency, both secular and –
most importantly – religious.
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History13:1 (2001), 9–41.Azza M. KaramPakistanPakistan is part of a region where the sense of the
spiritual is palpably present in ordinary people’s
lives. Islam is the shared identity of an otherwise
heterogeneous, multiethnic, and multilingual coun-
try. Islam provides community, ethics, morality, and
rituals, understood and practiced in myriad ways,
not all of which are accepted by high, scripturalist
Islam. Islam is a living oral spiritual tradition, an
essential part of women’s lives; they understand it
in ways that help them make sense of their lives. In
this context, a small minority of literate, urban,
and relatively privileged women participate in or
oppose the Islamist movement.
Islam as personal faith of the literate and the
non-literate, Islam as a movement in opposition to
oppressive regimes, and Islam as an oppressive
theocracy are three distinct phenomena. While the
last two in particular are male defined enterprises,
Islam as faith may have the least confining or the
most liberating potential for women. This potential
fast declines in Islamist opposition movements and
tends toward gross oppression in theocratic Islam-
ist governments. Pakistan’s government has vacil-
lated between military dictatorship and civilian rule
or a combination of the two. Ayub Khan (1958–69)
liberalized family laws to make them slightly more
equitable for women. Zia ul-Haq (1977–88) disen-
franchised women to an alarming degree under the
pretext of Islamization. The current military ruler,
Pervez Musharraf, seems inclined toward undoing
Zia ul-Haq’s Hudood Ordinances but faces strong
opposition from the Islamists within and outside
the parliament. The Islamist movement and Islam-
ist elements within the government generate a dis-
course of “liberation” of women from “Western
ignorance.” In a Muslim country with a colonial
past and with deep sympathies for countries like
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine, anti-Western sen-
timent serves the Islamists well as women’s libera-
tion/feminism is presented as a ploy to further
destroy the fabric of Muslim life.
Islamist activity revolves around two main axes,
personal reform and political ascendancy. Personal
reform is carried out through preaching (da≠wa)
and creation of Islamized space entailing segregation,