prayer, fasting, and veiling of women. It does not
necessarily ask urban women to return to their
homes but endeavors to separate them in public.
Women are increasingly engaged in religious, cul-
tural, and social life outside the private realm, but
this has not led to a new model of womanhood.
Conventional female virtues like modesty, obedi-
ence, and self-sacrifice in relation to children and
family are still upheld even when women actively
engage in public life in ways that were previously
inaccessible to them. Political ascendancy entails
will to gain political power based on the belief that
Islam is the only true religion and that it requires
governance according to God given and unchange-
able laws. These laws mostly uphold male and
Muslim supremacy, surveillance and control of
Muslim women’s lives, disenfranchisement of reli-
gious minorities, and criminalization of sexual
minorities. Leadership in the name of God is the
prerogative of Muslim men although women are
not prohibited from participation at the lower
levels.
The thrust of most Islamist movements is to keep
women in a subordinate place even after they have
gained access to means of self empowerment such
as education and paid work in the public sector.
Escape from freedom and escape from materialism
are given as two reasons for women’s willing par-
ticipation in Islamist movements.
Women continue to be the object and primary
victim of Islamist discourse in Pakistan. The so-
called Islamization during Zia ul-Haq’s military
regime and now of the North West Frontier prov-
ince focuses on reclaiming traditional male privi-
lege, which may seem to be slipping away with the
modernization and education of women.
In the vacuum created by a politically stifling and
at times treacherous environment, which seriously
curtails the possibility of free exchange of ideas
between women of various persuasions, secular
and religious, Muslim and non-Muslim, it is move-
ments such as al-Huda, led by Dr. Farhat Hashmi,
an Islamist female scholar/preacher, that take hold.
Dr. Hashmi’s organization has gained some follow-
ing amongst the literate urban women in the major
cities of Pakistan. She advocates ™ijàband calls
women to study the text of the Qur±àn for them-
selves. She makes the familiar claim that it is the
male interpretations of the word of God which
have subjugated and oppressed women, and that as
women study the Qur±àn themselves they will be
liberated. The study of Qur±àn in her centers is lim-
ited to a preliminary study of the meaning of the
Arabic text in Urdu. Relative to the circumstances
of the individual woman Hashmi’s message may610 political-social movements: islamist movements and discourses
have some liberating elements. Hashmi’s schools
have provided a safe haven for modern educated
and elite women who are seeking to hold onto a
respectable traditional identity while integrating
into a male workforce or enjoying the lifestyle of
the privileged housewife.
The United States based Pakistani theologian Dr.
Riffat Hassan has pointed out that Hashmi does
not engage with any real issues of social and eco-
nomic justice. According to Hassan this is a be-
trayal of a religion that takes egalitarianism and
social justice very seriously. Hashmi, an Islamist
and Hassan, a liberation theologian, both rally
Muslim women back to an interpretation of a
Qur±àn affected by their geographical and ideologi-
cal location. Neither of them has formulated
a cogent theological response to contemporary
developments in historical critical studies of Islam.
The work of secular women activists and lawyers
is another important context for discussing women
and Islamist discourse in Pakistan. According to
Hassan the shortcoming of the human rights activ-
ism and discourse is its anti-religious stance, which
cannot gain root in a religious society like Pakistan.
Hassan makes a distinction between a secularism
that respects the individual’s freedom of choice in
matters religious and a secularism that is anti-reli-
gious. She considers the work of human rights
activists and lawyers, such as Asma Jehangir, to be
socially and politically irrelevant in Pakistan be-
cause of their “anti-religious” stance. In her cri-
tique of Jehangir, Hassan seems to confuse Islam as
personal faith with Islam as a theocratic imposi-
tion. Hassan proposes that Jehangir assume an
American-style religion-friendly secularism in a
theocratic state like Pakistan and that she respect
“freedom of religion” in a political context where
there is very little freedom of religion. Since the
almost theocratic Pakistan is a signatory to United
Nations documents, in advocating for individuals’
rights vis-à-vis the state, having recourse to inter-
national standards of human rights (as upheld in
documents generated and endorsed by the United
Nations) is a valid strategy especially when very few
other options are available. On the other hand, dis-
courses that draw on the liberating and empower-
ing elements of the people’s own heritage and
beliefs may be most relevant and effective as means
of empowerment at the grassroots level. However,
these may not accord with Hassan’s understanding
of “ethical-normative” Islam, which she sees as the
option that would bring desperately needed posi-
tive social change in Pakistan. Hassan’s Inter-
national Network for the Rights of Female Victims
of Violence in Pakistan (established 1999), which