Women & Islamic Cultures Family, Law and Politics

tice in the whole of Eastern Africa. Social pressure
to perform the operation is very strong. In Somalia,
where the prevalence of FGM approaches nearly
98 percent, it is Islamist organizations such as al-
Ittihad and al-Islah who strongly condemn the
practice and actively work against it. The Somalis
practice the “pharaonic” variety of FGM (infibula-
tion) resulting in serious risks for girls’ and
women’s health. The Somali Islamists consider it
forbidden in Islam to harm one’s own body. Al-
Ittihad women move around in public wearing a
burqa≠-like attire, with only a small space for the
eyes. Sometimes they even wear stockings and
gloves in the often extremely hot desert climate. But
the girls do not have to undergo FGM. In Somalia,
as elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is this non-
traditional attire of the women that distinguishes
them visibly as members of Islamist groups. The
practice of fully covering the head and body is
in most instances a recent phenomenon, imported
by the Islamists. Although in many Sub-Saharan
regions Islam has been present for many centuries,
the women did not usually cover their hair, except
for prayer.
Where and under what circumstances a woman’s
honor – and therefore the honor of her male rela-
tives – is considered to be in jeopardy is not univo-
cally determinable. In some instances, mixing of
men and women in public is problematic in the
view of African Islamists. In others it is not:
“Islamic” dress is viewed as sufficient to guarantee
the prevention of vice. The prevailing approach
varies and is likely to depend on a particular
sociopolitical situation and context. In the case of
Nigeria, in 1983 a number of Muslim politicians,
including the leader of the Islamist Yan Izala,
Abubakar Gumi, started a campaign for wider par-
ticipation of women in Nigerian politics. This
move was informed by the hope that a Muslim can-
didate would win the presidential election.
Abubakar Gumi appealed to Muslim men to allow
their wives and daughters to register for the elec-
tion and to go out and cast their votes, for as Gumi
phrased it: “politics is more important than
prayer.” His position was condemned by a number
of his opponents as outright heresy. Yet Gumi took
matters even further when he stated that the elec-
tion was to be considered a jihad. Muslims had to
protect their religion: if Muslim women did not
vote, a non-Muslim would win. Eventually, a
Muslim did win the election due to the mobiliza-
tion of the Muslim women’s vote. The same argu-
ments were used again in the next local government
election. On that occasion, the leader of Yan Izala
in Kaduna declared that Muslim women could

sub-saharan africa 613

leave their houses without any problem, as long as

they dressed properly. Men preventing their wives

from registering for the vote would feel sorry after-

wards, “because the wrong people would be voted

to power” (Loimeier 1997).

In some cases Islamist movements have stimu-

lated social emancipation among Muslim women.

This emancipation is not really driven by Islamist

ideology per se. On the one hand, women are rec-

ognized as Muslims able to acquire religious

knowledge independently. On the other hand, the

issue of morality in the Islamist discourse puts

the greatest burden on women. It seems that the

sociopolitical context and the power relations in a

given situation are of paramount importance in

determining Islamist discourse concerning gender

issues. Women in Islamist movements also have to

act within an existing context. Relations between

men and women as well as among the women

themselves within an Islamist organization is a mat-

ter of day-to-day negotiation. It is not unthinkable

that Islamism in female branches of Islamist move-

ments will ultimately develop its own dynamic. But

this depends on what is possible in a given context

and on the agency of the relevant actors – men and

women – themselves.

Bibliography

Primary sources

Amran Ali, businesswoman, interview with the author,

Hargeysa, 3 June 2002.

Le Musulman(journal of the Jamaatu Ibadu Rahmane)

47 (1994).

Secondary sources

B. M. Barkindo, Growing Islamism in Kano city since

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Marleen Renders