respondence with noblemen and courtiers that he
was able to bring some pressure to bear on the court
of Akbar’s successor, Jahàngìr.
The shaykh fought for the suppression of all
innovation (bid≠a) introduced into Islamic culture,
but, on the whole, his exhortations to this effect
were general and rarely attacked specific devia-
tions. However, in one letter, addressed unusually
to an anonymous Sufi woman, he did elaborate on
the innovations peculiar to Muslims in India, and
attributed many of them to the greater tendency of
women than men to perform blameworthy actions.
Utter stupidity on their part, he claimed, meant that
women prayed to stones and idols and asked for
their help to such an extent, especially at such times
of crisis as when smallpox struck, that virtually all
Indian Muslim women were involved in polytheis-
tic practices of one sort or another. Likewise, their
celebration of Hindu festivals such as Diwali, and
their insistence on sacrificing animals at the tombs
of Sufi saints, meant that they had violated the
conditions upon which the Prophet Mu™ammad
had accepted the “pledge of the women” (bay≠at al-
nisà±). As was the case with many Islamic reformers
of this and subsequent periods, lapses in correct
behavior on the part of Muslim women were held
responsible for much of what was perceived to be
wrong with existing Muslim society.
By the middle of the eighteenth century, mount-
ing pressure on Muslim interests in South Asia
helped to produce a further round of millenarian-
style movements. During this period, the might of
the Mughal Empire was steadily eroded by the rise
of various indigenous successor states and the
encroachment of European influence. Faced with
crisis on a massive scale, Muslim intellectuals in
centers of Muslim power such as Delhi grappled
with ways of responding. In Delhi, Shàh WalìAllàh
(1703–62), like Shaykh A™mad Sirhindì, believed
himself to be a mujaddid, charged with purifying
Islam from the accretions that he believed were
responsible for its political weakness. Again, like
his predecessors, while he came from a Sufi tradi-
tion and had been initiated into the Naqshbandì,
Chishtì, and Qàdirìorders, Shàh WalìAllàh was
highly critical of tomb worship and the veneration
of saints. Since Muslim women remained closely
associated with these populist forms of Islamic
practice, it can be deduced that such thinking must
have played a large part in marginalizing and un-
dermining central aspects of their spiritual lives,
devaluing to a great extent the authority that
they could exercise in relation to the rhythms and
nature of religious practice within their families
and communities.
south asia 621While Shàh WalìAllàh’s thinking had an enor-
mous impact on intellectual developments within
north Indian Islam and influenced a wide range of
later reformers, it was his “successors” in the nine-
teenth century who translated this thought into
action in the shape of a number of millenarian-style
protest movements. Again, however, the evidence
for how these movements affected women’s lives is
very sparse, and the conclusions that can be drawn
are largely conjectural. The best known nineteenth-
century movement was that associated with Sayyid
A™mad Shahìd of Rae Bareilly (1786–1831) who
studied for a period of time in Delhi under the
guidance of Shàh WalìAllàh’s son, ≠Abd al-≠Azìz
Dihlawì. A charismatic personality, he acquired
influential supporters who were attracted to his
emphasis on pure taw™ìd(monotheism) as well as
to his opposition to “saint worship” and social cus-
toms such as excessive expenditure on marriages
and the Hindu-like taboo against widow remar-
riage that had developed among many Indian
Muslims. Here again, it was on aspects of women’s
lives in particular that the spotlight of reform was
turned, though, as yet, there has been no academic
study undertaken to explore the specific conse-
quences of this movement from either a female or a
gender perspective. It is, however, now well estab-
lished that reform movements across the spectrum
at this time focused much of their effort on making
Muslim women into “better” Muslims, since they
were regarded by many reformers as holding the
key to community renewal.
Upon his return from performing pilgrimage
(™ajj) to Mecca in 1821, the Sayyid began to pre-
pare for a jihad, which was launched in 1827,
against the Sikhs in northwestern India. His defeat
and death at Balakot in 1831, however, did not put
an end to his Mujàhidìn movement, which per-
sisted for decades against the British presence, with
his followers often known as Wahhàbis on account
of alleged connections with the Arabian movement
of the same name. British perceptions that Wah-
hàbis played a key role in the Mutiny of 1857 inten-
sified efforts to control the movement, and two
major Wahhàbi trials were held in Amballa and
Patna in 1864 and 1870 respectively. Meanwhile,
the related Farà±idi movement led by £àjjìSharì≠at
Allàh (1781–1840) developed in Bengal during the
same period with similar priorities of fighting
against rites and rituals influenced by Hindu cus-
toms. Sharì≠at Allàh declared British India to be a
dàr al-™arb(land of war) and, therefore, permitted
no community prayers either on Fridays or on the
occasion of religious festivals. How far this partic-
ular proscription would have influenced women’s