of the FLN; and the Union nationale des femmes
marocaines, created in 1969 by the monarchy and
headed by the sister of King Hassan II – or within
the framework of the trade unions.
In all three countries, new forms of protest,
specifically feminist in their nature, have arisen
through the realization that improvements – very
real in Tunisia and Algeria; less so, or at least lim-
ited to certain sectors, in Morocco – did not trans-
late into a transformation of women’s status, or
worse, were used as a justification for the consoli-
dation of the patriarchal order. These new forms of
protest explicitly challenge the nature of gender
relations and question the reformist framework
within which women’s rights and status have been
discussed up to this moment. Still in question, in
terms that are specific to each country, is the possi-
bility for feminine demands and modes of action to
move toward an increased degree of autonomy.
Without delving into the details of mobilizations
taking place in each of the three countries, a num-
ber of common characteristics can be identified.
One is the focus on the question of personal sta-
tus, particularly in Algeria and in Morocco, where
feminist demands have centered around the re-
examination of the Family Code enacted by the
Assemblée nationale populaire in 1984 in Algeria,
and of the Mudawwana (code of personal status)
promulgated by Mohamed V in 1957 in Morocco.
Both codes adhere to the Muslim Sharì≠a on issues
such as polygamy, repudiation, matrimonial guar-
dianship, and inheritance. In both countries, pro-
test is voiced through press releases, petitions, and,
less frequently, marches and demonstrations organ-
ized by groups of women often comprised of intel-
lectuals and scholars, who have difficulties relating
to women from lower classes, especially rural
women. At the core of the argument formulated by
feminists in Algeria and Morocco is the denuncia-
tion of the codes as unconstitutional insofar as they
contradict the principle of equality of all citizens
affirmed in each country’s constitution, and are
incompatible with international conventions signed
by both countries. In Algeria, no notable results
have been achieved: the regime’s promises to re-
examine the Family Code are regularly forgotten as
soon as the electoral campaigns have ended, as was
the case in 1999 when Abdelaziz Bouteflika was
elected president, and after the May 2002 legisla-
tive elections. More substantial progress has been
attained in Morocco, where in October 2003, King
Mohamed VI implemented profound changes to
the Mudawwana, which fulfilled some of the most
fundamental demands by militant members of the
women’s movement – in particular the abolition of
north africa 641matrimonial guardianship (wilàya), the restriction
of polygamy, and the institution of legal divorce in
place of †alàq. In Tunisia, feminist protest tends to
align itself with a more general movement that favors
human rights against the authoritarian regime of
Zinelabidine Ben Ali – though some women will-
ingly accept token positions in government. In a
country whose personal status code is considered
the most progressive in the region, women’s resist-
ance since the 1980s has been based on the denun-
ciation of the dichotomy that exists between the
law and promises made by politicians, which out-
line tangible benefits for women that must be
defended, and the reality of masculine domination,
which, for intellectuals in feminist circles, appears
to have been only superficially challenged.
In Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia alike, the ques-
tion of women’s participation in the political pro-
cess tests the ability of feminist militants to put in
place autonomous organizational structures in a
fundamentally hostile environment: since they have
not succeeded in influencing single parties or par-
ties that hold some sort of monopoly on political
legitimacy, such as the FLN, the Neo-Destour, or
the Union socialiste des forces populaires (USFP),
which they cannot afford to leave, feminist mili-
tants tend to rely on two fall-back strategies as they
organize themselves. First, they work within the
realm of civil society by creating an increasing
number of associations specializing in problems
that affect women (literacy, single mother assis-
tance, domestic violence, and so forth) as well as
general interest non-governmental organizations,
which operate independently of “official” feminist
groups –the Association démocratique des femmes
du Maroc and the Union de l’action féminine in
Morocco; Egalité, emancipation et promotion and
the Association pour le triomphe du droit des femmes
in Algeria; Club Tahar Haddad, the Association des
femmes universitaires, and the Association tunisi-
enne des femmes démocrates in Tunisia – and whose
objective is to put pressure on the political estab-
lishment. Second, they concentrate on the regional
and international arenas, where they work through
human rights organizations, the United Nations
system, European and North American feminist
organizations, and foundations for development
assistance. This strategy has yielded some positive
results in recent years: for instance, the World
Bank’s technical and financial assistance in the
preparation of the “Plan d’intégration des femmes
au développement” drafted by a group of Moroc-
can feminists and later embraced by the new govern-
ment. Another achievement was the collaboration
of feminists from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia,