conventional disciplinary and issue-area bound-
aries and categories.
Developments in postcolonial dissent have emerged
in part out of particular urgencies brought on by
the economic and political crises that hit both
countries in 1997–9, including mass riots and the
overthrow of the 30-year Suharto regime in
Indonesia and the jailing of the progressive Deputy
Prime Minister Ibrahim Anwar in Malaysia on spe-
cious charges of corruption and sodomy. One of
Anwar’s major contributions to political activism
was his popularization of the term masyarakat
madani, Malay for “civil society,” which he pro-
moted as a “path for a Malaysian-style Islamic
modernity and civilization (Othman 2003, 126). In
contrast to other Malaysian leaders, Anwar argued
that masyarakat madanirequired “a political cli-
mate which accepts dissent, critical judgment, and
pluralistic views as part of the democratic process
of governance” (ibid., 127); these views inspired
the group of supporters who demonstrated against
his incarceration in 1998.
As these crises have unfolded, activists have been
increasingly ready to respond, because of wide-
spread awareness of how national governments,
like their colonial predecessors, use ethnic, reli-
gious, and class- and gender-based “divide and
conquer” techniques to distract the populace. As
Ariel Heryanto and Sumit Mandal explain in their
recent book Challenging Authoritarianism in South-
east Asia: Comparing Indonesia and Malaysia, the
term reformasi(reform) traveled across the border
in 1998 from Indonesia to Malaysia, along with
the idea of “reformasiactivism” (Heryanto and
Mandal 2003, 7). Reformers in both nations are
currently in the process of comparing the structures
of “othering” that occur between ethnic groups,
particularly concerning Chinese populations (ibid.,
8–11), and indigenous peoples. Similar cross-bor-
der activity is evident among Muslim feminists, as
evidenced in regional workshops sponsored by the
Malaysian group Sisters in Islam.
Challenges to postcolonial
dissent
Postcolonial dissent in the diasporic arena differs
from that practiced within the “excolonized
nations” such as Malaysia and Indonesia in two
ways. First, activists from these nations experience
a greater degree of danger and sacrifice in their
efforts; they have been vulnerable to imprisonment
without trial, torture, and other forms of silencing.
Second, political and religious leaders in both
Malaysia and Indonesia are adept in presenting cri-
tiques of the West that coincide with the intention-
malaysia and indonesia 673ality of postcolonial dissent even as they maintain
the hierarchical structuring of “East versus West”
of the colonial period. Malaysia’s Prime Minister
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad has been instrumental in
promoting the idea of “Asian values,” in response
to threats to Malaysia’s sovereignty by the inter-
national human rights regime together with the
regimes of economic globalization (interventions
by the International Monetary Fund and more re-
cently, the World Trade Organization). While the
concept of “Asian values” is meant to empower
Asian nations, it does so at the expense of popular
sovereignty within Malaysia, as it promotes com-
munal and patriarchal values for the purposes of
maintaining a strict socioeconomic order. Similarly,
the denunciation by Muslim leaders of “Western”
practices in an effort to create a sense of Islamic
unity and dignity has in some instances led to a loss
of women’s rights. While women have increasingly
donned the jilbab(head covering) in part to pro-
mote Islamic empowerment, changes in Malaysian
family law have restricted their rights in marriage
and divorce (Othman 2003, 139). In Indonesia,
Muslim leaders presented readings of Islamic texts
to argue that a woman could not take the role of the
presidency. In both cases, the rhetoric of postcolo-
nial dissent was utilized to negate its fundamental
spirit by reversing efforts to dismantle hierarchical
and exclusive power structures to the benefit of the
underrepresented and subaltern.Responses to the “Asian values”
debate
One dissenting voice in the “Asian values” de-
bate has come from Malaysian human rights
organization SUARAM (Suara Rakyat Malaysia,
People’s voice of Malaysia). Speaking for the
group, Kua Kia Soong has argued that Asian soci-
ety and culture encompass more than the narrowly
defined model Dr. Mohamad put forth. Asian val-
ues may also include the philosophies of Hindu,
Buddhist, and Taoist philosophies (represented by
Malaysia’s Indian and Chinese populations) as well
as animist beliefs held by indigenous peoples of the
region, and as such, a respect for human life, social
equity, and “ecological harmony” (Kua Kia Soong
2001, 10). With this approach, SUARAM has
worked with other human rights and environmen-
tal justice activists to reframe struggles against
Malaysia’s economic development policies in terms
of popular rather than national sovereignty and
human security as opposed to national security.
SUARAM focuses on struggles for popular sover-
eignty – the rights of peoples whose lands have been
targeted for development by the central government