laws. Ashraf ≠AlìThànawì, a leading Islamic scholar/
reformer in the 1930s worked with Muslim con-
verts in Punjab and Central India to eradicate
non-Islamic and pre-Islamic practices, which sub-
sequently led to the Shariat Act of 1937. He en-
gaged in the same political and legislative activity
to find Islamic precedent for Muslim women to
seek divorce, which subsequently led to the Dis-
solution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. While
Thànawìwas sharply critical of the “state’s” treat-
ment of Muslim personal law, it was this institution
that he approached first to rectify its legal misper-
ceptions. The critics of the Shah Bano judgment
approached the state in the same way. Even though
the state is often blamed for interpreting and mis-
interpreting religious laws, its critics have invari-
ably appealed to it. Religious and political leaders
are not completely opposed to state intervention
when it is advantageous to them. These laws
become off-limits only when they concern judicial
scrutiny and reform in favor of women’s rights.
For a long time after independence, the standard
liberal-modernist and feminist narratives demanded
the abolition of personal laws and the institution of
a uniform civil code on liberal grounds of equal
rights for women. This argument called for reforms
from above on the initiative of the state much the
same way as reforms were introduced within Hin-
duism in the mid-1950s. Pitted against them were
the conservative communitarians who demanded
strict maintenance of separate personal laws for
each religious group. However, the modernist and
feminist positions have changed in part because of
their appropriation by Hindu nationalists and also
because of the Muslim perception of external threat
to their religious identity and culture prompted by
the dramatic growth of the Hindu right and its
ambition to establish a singular citizenship through
an eradication of the legal recognition of commu-
nity differences. This has meant a less secure envi-
ronment for minorities, especially Muslims. But,
more importantly, the assertion of Hindu identity is
taking place through a renewed emphasis on Mus-
lim identity as obscurantist and fundamentalist.
Given that Hindu nationalism has now become a
powerful political force, many feminists feel rather
uncomfortable with the demand for state-initiated
personal law reform, considering that the call for
uniform laws could turn into a device to attack
minorities. In view of this, a reformist position in
which personal laws need internal reform, not out-
right rejection, has gathered support since the early
1990s.
Ideally, the initiative for change of personal laws
should come from within the community, which
overview 743can better define the scope, institutional location,
and justification for reform. However, the basic
problem is the absence of authoritative institu-
tional structures within the Muslim community
that can undertake this difficult project. In the last
few years women’s groups, principally Muslim
women’s organizations, have mobilized in favor of
the internal reform project. They have addressed
their reformist appeal to the ≠ulamà±and at the same
time made efforts to influence public opinion. In
October 2000 and April 2001 the Muslim Personal
Law Board, a male-dominated body of over 150
Muslim clerics held meetings in Bangalore and
New Delhi concerning the problems of Muslim
women in the light of the Sharì≠a. For the first time
Muslim women and religious clerics shared a com-
mon platform to discuss issues of Muslim personal
laws. Both meetings witnessed Muslim women
raising their voice in favor of change and the reli-
gious clerics dodging the issue by blaming unjust
religious practices on the distortions in Muslim
samaj or society, which needs reform, rather than
personal laws as such.
Yet all these initiatives have not had the effect of
promoting reform because the conditions for mean-
ingful dialogue are wanting. This is due mainly to
the multiplicity and heterogeneity of the commu-
nity, which makes the emergence of a resolute lead-
ership of the entire community very difficult. The
Muslim community is diverse, heterogeneous, and
hierarchical, with no identifiable institution and
agencies with the requisite power and legitimacy to
interpret and undertake reform. What counts as the
leadership of the community is an artifact of power.
Governmental policy in the Shah Bano case played
right into the hands of powerful religious leaders
who do not consult women. It bolstered the exist-
ing power structure of the community and accepted
the clergy as the sole spokesmen and allowed them
to define any potential change in the Muslim com-
munity’s practices as a distortion of religiously
sanctioned practices. Moreover, the external envi-
ronment is not conducive to modernization owing
to the insecurity in which most Muslims live. The
majority within the Muslim community, which
most likely supports reform, is unable to overcome
its defensiveness toward external and internal pres-
sures on the community.
In this situation the Latifijudgment is a step for-
ward in the road to equality between the sexes
because it provides a predominantly social, rather
than religious, grounding for maintenance provi-
sions. By interpreting the provisions of the MWA in
a manner that enhances rights of women by taking
into account gender disparities and social conditions,