Operational mishaps
On 15 January 1993, just two weeks before the end of its trading year, Laura
Ashley issued a profits warning to an unsuspecting City. Something had
gone badly wrong with the US operations. Analysts, acting on information
from Kleinwort Benson (Laura Ashley’s stockbroker), slashed profit fore-
casts for the year from £6 million to £2 million, and waited nervously for
the company to release its final figures. In the meantime, Maxmin contin-
ued to invest in the brand through a £2 million image advertising cam-
paign. The campaign, aimed at reviving Laura Ashley’s long neglected
relations with the fashion press, celebrated the company’s 40th birthday.
When the year end results were finally announced on 15 April, they were
very much as expected. Laura Ashley was back in profit for the first time
in four years – but only just – with group profits of £1.8 million before tax.
Massive operating losses in the US had almost wiped out the profits gen-
erated from improved trading in the rest of the world. For the third year in
succession the company paid its shareholders only a nominal dividend of
1p per share. Details of the US catastrophe had started to bubble to the
surface a few days before the announcement.
The US distribution system had apparently collapsed following the relo-
cation of its headquarters from Mawah to Boston, New Jersey. Staffing
levels were reduced from 350 to 80, though only a handful made the move.
The remaining staff did not know how to operate the stock allocation
systems; consequently, all US stores were supplied with identical product
allocations. A tiny store on the outskirts of Houston, Texas, received the
same number of woollen sweaters and ballgowns as the flagship store on
New York’s Madison Avenue. Back in Wales, bewildered managers,
anxious to reduce the company’s stock levels, watched US sales plummet
while stock levels soared (refer to Table 6.1.6 for details of total stocks as a
percentage of sales). In desperation, they cut off all stock supplies to the US
for 60 days. Meanwhile, equally desperate store managers drove around
America swapping car loads of stock with other Laura Ashley stores. In
June 1992, when the problems were most acute, there were over 110, 000
stock swaps between the US stores, an average of 550 per shop.
The self-inflicted wound damaged Maxmin’s credibility in the City and
with the financial press, but following assurances that the US situation was
now under control, they deferred judgement for the time being. A month
later, Bernard Ashley, who had not attended a board meeting for over a
year, resigned as company Chairman. Taking the title of Honorary Life
President, Ashley retained a place on the board as a Non-executive
Director, but reduced his share in the company to 36 per cent. Deputy
Chairman and Non-executive Director, Hugh Blakeway Webb, moved up
to become Non-executive Chairman. Blakeway Webb, a barrister and
former partner of accountants, Deloitte Haskins & Sells, joined the
448 Relationship Marketing