The early attempts were not followed by related studies. Varela’s project has not found wide-
spread adoption (Allefeld 2008:18). Varela’s wish of establishing a phenomenologically oriented re-
search community has not been fulfilled.
In a recent publication, Zahavi (2010:14-15) discusses the possibility of establishing a naturalized
phenomenology. He dissociates himself from the radical definition proposed by Petitot et al. in 1999,
and suggests a more modest proposal, arguing that,
”a naturalized phenomenology is the kind of phenomenology that engages in a meaning-
ful and productive exchange with empirical science. Phenomenology can question and
elucidate basic theoretical assumptions made by empirical science, just as it might aid
in the development of new experimental paradigms. Empirical science can present phe-
nomenology with concrete findings that it cannot simply ignore, but must be able to acco-
modate; evidence that might force it to refine or revise its own analyses.”A reconciliation of phenomenology and neuroscience according to Zahavi’s proposal may not be im-
possible. Yet, the integration of the first-person perspective of phenomenology and the third-person
perspective of neuroscience remains a demanding task. It will require a considerable working effort
from both parties, and an untiring willingness to reconsider established convictions and procedures
in philosophy and science.