- Aim at intersubjective corroboration
Phenomenological inquiry is not confined to the experience of one individual. According to Heideg-
ger, the understanding of being in the world implies the understanding of others (1962:161). It is Mer-
leau-Ponty’s stance that a personal existence resumes a prepersonal tradition (2002:296). Phenom-
enological description invites and requires intersubjective comparison and corroboration (Gallagher
and Zahavi 2008:28). Phenomenological investigation is destined for others through intersubjective
validation (Varela 1996:339).
Ihde’s phenomenological approach involves intersubjective research and classroom inves-
tigation (1976:xix, 33, 1977:69-74) ). According to Ihde, “it remains important that all variations be
checked and cross-checked and not taken in their first and most superficial sense” (1976:33). - Explore time-consciousness
When we perceive events in the world, we do not perceive each event as an isolated ”now”, but as
part of a continuation within a field of presence. We hear a melody as a continuity, where each tone
is connected to the previous tones, and connected to the succeeding tones. In the field of presence,
we experience a ”now” in relation to the ”now” that has just been, and the ”now” which will immedi-
ately appear. Husserl describes the consciousness of the just-past as retention and the conscious-
ness of the upcoming future as protention. The field of presence is a continuum which is constantly
modified, as each ”now” is changed into a past (Husserl 1964:49-50, 62, 76-79).^6
The structure protention - perception - retention is an invariant structure of consciousness underly-
ing the generation of a field of lived presence (Gallagher & Zahavi 2008:78). Merleau-Ponty directly
states that consciousness constitutes time (2002:481). In the perception of sound and music, it is
possible to perform temporal phenomenological variations by directing the focus of attention towards
the beginning of the sound, the full sonorous quality, or the running-off of the sound (Ihde 2007:108).
Similarly, it is possible to vary one’s field of observation from the narrow focus on a single tone to a
broad or wide temporal focus, which encompasses larger segments of the musical course.
Phenomenological investigation does not exclude verification by means of printed scores. Clifton
(1983) supports and documents his phenomenological observations with numerous score excerpts,
and Ferrara develops a method for analyzing the “sound-in-time”, which implies accurate score refer-
ences (1991:206-216). However, as Lochhead has pointed out (2006a: 68-70), the primary function
of musical notation is prescriptive, not descriptive. The score is a “recipe” for performance, and it
serves to define a musical work apart from its performances. For the phenomenological description
of music, listening is the primary source. Additionally, score reading can enhance the listening expe-
rience by clarifying musical details, visualizing simultaneous layers of the music, and facilitating the
overview of the musical form.
- Include the lifeworld as the prerequisite for phenomenological investigation
Consciousness is not separated from the world. As conscious beings, we are already in the world,
and the others are already there with us. For Heidegger, this implies that the fundamental philosoph-
ical task is to clarify the meaning of being in the world. Consequently, he coins the term ”Dasein”,
”being-there”, for a human being (Heidegger 1962:31-32, 152). Dasein is already situated in a social,
cultural and historical situation, participating and acting in a field of signification, and thus phenome-
6 Husserl gave his lectures on the phenomenology of internal time-consciousness 1904-10, and they were published by
Heidegger in 1928 (Husserl 1928/1964).
In The Concept of Nature (1920), The philosopher Alfred N. Whitehead (1861-1947) proposed a similar descripti-
on of the temporal field, concluding: ”What we perceive as present is the vivid fringe of memory tinged with anticipation.”
(Whitehead 1920/2004:73).
In Principles of Psychology (1890), the psychologist William James (1842-1910) discussed the concept of ”the
specious present”, indicating that the ”now” we perceive as present includes a small but extended interval of time. (Ander-
son & Grush 2009:278).