union representatives. The dual system of unions and works committees had
to be confronted by GM’s managers in attempting to implement teamwork.
The form of teamwork favoured by management for its Spanish plant
had many common elements with the model operating in its other plants.
The key aspects included: work being organised into teams of between 8 and
15 people; operators rotating across jobs within a team; members of a team
meeting regularly to discuss possible improvements to their work; and ‘the
usual rhetoric about fostering a “team spirit” between workers and the com-
pany’ (Ortiz, 1998: 46). The initial proposals envisaged maintenance workers
being required to engage in ‘mixed teams’ with production workers.
Moreover, the appointment of a team leader by the company was significant
since he or she was to have a role in the appraisal and promotion of mem-
bers of the team.
Towards the end of 1992 managers and unions began the process of
negotiations concerning the introduction of teamwork. The unions were ini-
tially sceptical, expressing concerns about potential job losses, the prospect
of work becoming intensified, the danger of unions being marginalised by
the identification of workers with their teams, and the possibility that work-
ers would not share in the benefits of the resulting higher productivity.
Despite these concerns, and a history of division between the UGT and the
CCOO, the two main union groups did cooperate with management and
managed to negotiate a number of concessions. For instance, teamworking
was to be piloted for a year in the first instance, workers would only join the
experiment voluntarily, and maintenance workers were excluded from team-
work. While these concessions ameliorated the concerns of many union rep-
resentatives, they also saw some possible advantages of the scheme: job
rotation could help relieve monotony and avoid the danger of repetitive
strain injuries; many workers (particularly those in low grades) could be pro-
moted; teamwork could increase the autonomy that workers enjoyed from
supervisors; and it could also result in more information being provided to
workers and unions. Moreover, possible opposition from unionists was fur-
ther eroded by pressure from the company, since managers stressed the
multinational character of the company and the competitive position of the
plant within it. Many union leaders had been taken to visit other plants
implementing teamwork practices, creating a sense of it being an inevitable
development in Spain too. For the leaders of the CCOO, now controlled by
more ‘moderates’, opposing teamwork seemed futile and risked marginalis-
ing the union since the UGT would probably go along with management. In
November 1993 agreement was reached at the works committee.
This shows the way that a powerful company can exert influence over
the constraints of national business systems. By instilling competitive relations
between plants, and by making concessions on some aspects of their plans,
managers were able to break down resistance from unions, resulting in the
constraints becoming partial rather than absolute. However, this was not the
end of the story. At the end of the pilot scheme in November 1994 there was
a call from the minority union, the USO, for a workforce ballot to decide on
whether to stick with teamwork. Despite a campaign for ratification from all
the unions the workers voted narrowly to reject the proposal. There appeared
to be a number of reasons why employees were more hostile to teamwork
than were their unions. Some workers, particularly those with scarce skills,Transfer of Employment Practices Across Borders in MNCs 405