negotiations (Hancké, 2000). Amongst employers, the organizations responsible
for sector-level negotiations are strongly opposed to cross-border co-ordination.
The management of MNCs, by contrast, is increasingly co-ordinating bargain-
ing over working practices and working time arrangements across countries,
reflecting a range of ‘isomorphic’ pressures. In so doing, the role of headquar-
ters management in enforcing ‘coercive comparisons’ is becoming increasingly
transparent, potentially exposing it to future demands from employee
representatives for more European-level negotiations.
Arguably, however, most fundamental of all is the tension at the heart of
collective bargaining itself. It is perhaps best summed up in the phrase that
policy makers have increasingly used in recent years to seek to maintain a
balance, i.e. flexibility andsecurity. As the previous section has argued, the
multiple roles that collective bargaining is required to play put a premium on
flexibility. Yet experience suggests that, to paraphrase Wedderburn (1997: 11),
the effectiveness of processes such as integrative bargaining and social dia-
logue depend on a ‘fundament’ of ‘hard’ regulation, be it ‘constitutional prin-
ciple’, ‘legislative provision’, ‘tough judges’ or collective agreements. It is this
fundament of ‘hard’ regulation that gives employee representatives the confi-
dence to engage in these processes as well as legitimizing them in the eyes of
managers.
The forthcoming enlargement of the EU in 2004 is likely to be especially
critical in terms of future direction, meaning more of the same or an unravel-
ling of the balance. Self-evidently, enlargement means that the collective
action problem cannot fail to grow, making any consensus even more difficult
to achieve. The difficulties of reaching agreement have been substantial
enough with the original six member countries, let alone the present 15 coun-
tries. They will become even greater when the EU expands to embrace 25 coun-
tries. Perhaps even more important, though, is the fact that the accession
states’ institutional framework of industrial relations remains relatively imma-
ture and, crucially, the predominant pattern of collective bargaining is single
employer rather than multi-employer, reflecting weak or non-existent employ-
ers’ organizations. Moreover, the accession countries are at very different stages
of economic development, with wages and conditions lagging behind those of
most EU member states. Not surprisingly, the priorities are very different.
Indeed, such is the commitment of some of the leaderships to the neo-liberal
position that it has been suggested that the accession countries may turn out
to be the ‘Trojan Horse’ for the much-feared ‘Americanization’ of industrial
relations (Meardi, 2002). Complexity, uncertainty and instability look set to be
the defining characteristics of industrial relations in Europe for the foreseeable
future.
In the following and final chapter Paul Marginson takes our analysis to the
company level by examining the relevance of the concept of the Eurocompany
within (European) industrial relations.
452 International Human Resource Management