EWC agreementsPart of Streeck’s argument is that in their basic structure EWCs will reflect
nationally based structures for employee information and consultation: that,
following the French model, EWCs in French-based MNCs are constituted as
joint management–employee structures whereas, in accordance with the
German model, their counterparts in German-based EWCs are employee-only
structures (Streeck, 1997: 331). Findings from analyses of agreements support
this, but only up to a point (Marginson et al., 1998; Carley and Marginson,
2000). Whereas virtually all EWCs in French-based MNCs are joint bodies, less
than three-quarters of those in MNCs headquartered in Austria, Germany and
the Netherlands are employee-only. In other words, a substantial minority
break with the established model for these countries and establish joint EWCs.
Amongst UK-based MNCs the great majority have opted for joint structures,
arguably reflecting the practice of joint consultation arrangements where such
exist. Yet in the Nordic countries, a mixed approach is also evident: two-thirds
of EWCs in MNCs based in these countries are joint bodies, whilst one-third
are employee-only. In part this reflects variations in national practice between
the four countries, but in Denmark and Sweden the constitution of a number
of EWCs breaks with national traditions (Knudsen and Bruun, 1998: 138–9).
National systems, whilst being an important influence on this basic feature of
EWCs, do not appear to be an overriding one.
More generally, four influences on the contents of EWC agreements are
apparent (Gilman and Marginson, 2002). First, are the terms of the EWC direc-
tive itself, or a ‘statutory model effect’, including both specific requirements
detailed in the directive and the terms of the statutory fall-back model
appended to the directive which are to be applied in the event that negotiations
fail to result in agreement. For example, as compared with agreements con-
cluded in the period before the directive came into force in September 1996,
later agreements are more likely to contain provision for the employee side to
have access to independent experts and to convene additional EWC meetings
should extraordinary circumstances arise. Both these are matters directly
covered in the directive. Second is a ‘country effect’ under which industrial
relations arrangements in the European country in which an MNC is head-
quartered, and particularly those for employee information and consultation,
influence the provision of EWC agreements. In addition to the basic structure
of EWCs, referred to above, the country effect is evident in the extent to which
trade union officials are explicitly acknowledged as having the right to attend
and participate in EWCs, something which is more common, for example,
amongst MNCs based in France than in their Dutch or German counterparts. The
influence of different systems of corporate governance is also evident in the
stipulation of confidentiality clauses, which are significantly more widespread
amongst EWCs in UK-based MNCs than amongst their counterpartsin French,
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