state are pivotal to understanding how stable markets
emerge.
7 Few people even refer to the Bank of England as the
‘Old Lady’ any longer.
8 This is a two-way process. The language of ‘moral
hazard’, a theory particularly beloved of neoliberal
economists and politicians which posits that the effect
of government action to rescue bankrupt institutions is
to encourage irresponsible behaviour on the part of
individuals, developed in the USA in the nineteenth
century in response to a perception that new forms of
insurance threatened public morality: ‘The rhetoric of
moral hazard permitted the insurance men to deny that
insurance broke with conventional morality, and to
believe their denial, even as the enterprise they built
traveled down the road toward the abandonment of
morality in favor of a populational, actuarial under-
standing of that world’ (Baker, 1996: 260; although
subsequently Baker, 2000, modifies his claim that con-
ventional morality was abandoned).
9 Nigel Thrift has similarly subjected the notion of the
'new economy' to critical interrogation, and argues that
it is a constructed entity rather than something which
has emerged as a result of some overarching economic
rationality: ‘by the mid 1990s, the new economy had
already become a stable rhetorical form, in common
usage in business and government, and seeping into
popular culture. In effect the new economy had
become a kind of brand, compounding in one phrase
the attractions and rewards of a new version of capi-
talism’ (2001: 415). The new economy is viewed as a
form of ramp created by five sets of stakeholders: the
cultural circuit of capital (the machine for producing
and disseminating knowledge to business elites);
governments; non-business-school academics (‘Econo-
mists, in other words, began to produce a formal body
of knowledge which could act as serious confirmation
of more general (and rather flighty) business knowl-
edge’, 2001: 415); managers; and information and
communications technology which ‘has now reached
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