are different aspects of handling the organized sounds our various societies
label as music.
That observation led back to a logicall yprior question: Is there an ything
that all examples of expertisein generalshould or might have in common? More
precisely, is there anything about theinternalpsychological structures of certain
accomplishmentsthatmarksthemoutasexamplesofexpertise?Itisimpor-
tant to remember that when someone is declared an expert, that is a social act
that ma yor ma ynot correspond to an intrinsic characteristic of the person so
designated.
One possible definition of an expert is ‘‘someone who performs a task sig-
nificantl ybetter (b ysome specified criterion) than the majorit yof people.’’ Ac-
cording to this definition, Chase and Ericsson’s (1981) digit memorizer SF is an
expert. If, however, digit-span recall became a popular hobby, then he might
well be overtaken b ysufficient numbers of people so that he would cease to be
considered an expert. Such a relativistic attribution of expertise clearl ywould
preclude the possibilit yof an ycognitiveaccountofexpertise,becausethecog-
nitive apparatus that earned SF expert status would remain precisel ythe same
after SF was no longer labeled an expert. It does, however, seem to me that
exactl ysuch a relativistic conception underlies much common talk of exper-
tise, and to a certain extent determines the agendas of ‘‘expertise’’ research.
For cognitive psychology to have an authentic foothold, we have to find a
characterization of expertise that will allow an ynumber of people (up to and
including all) to be expert in a particular area. For instance, man ywould, I
think, agree that the vast majorit yof people are expert speakers of their native
languages. I shall later suggest that the majorit yof our population possess
particular types of musical expertise. A possible definition with this outcome
mightrelatetothereliableattainmentofspecificgoalswithinaspecificdo-
main. So, for instance, one is an expert diner if one can get a wide variet yof
foodstuffs from plate to mouth without spilling anything.
An apparent problem with this definition, however, is that there is no lower
limit to the simplicit yor specificit yof the task to which one can appl yit. For
instance, this definition would allow each of us to be expert at pronouncing his
or her own name or at folding his or her arms. It ma yseem that we need more
than goal attainment to attribute expertise. For instance, one ma ywant to sa y
that an expert is someone who can make an appropriate response to a situation
that contains a degree of unpredictability. So the expert bridge player is one
who can work out the pla ymost likel yto win with a hand that the pla yer has
never seen before; the expert doctor is one who can provide an appropriate di-
agnosis when faced with a configuration of symptoms never before encoun-
tered. In this wa ywe might be able to carve out precisel ythe set of activities in
which various experts have been interested.
On further examination, however, it is not as eas yto appl ythis distinction as
it might first appear. Pronouncing one’s own name can also be seen as an act
requiring the handling of unpredictability. It is an act that is occasioned by cues
(external or internal) that can vary. One must be able to retrieve and execute
the required motor program regardless of the immediate mental context. The
complexit yof these apparentl ysimple acts is soon revealed when one attempts
566 John A. Sloboda