The psychological principles discussed in this chapter do not form a unified
theory, comparable to the rational theory of choice. However, they help explain
a wide range of empirical findings that are incompatible with the rational
theory. Recall that this theory assumes consistent preferences that satisfy de-
scription and procedure invariance. In contrast, the experimental evidence sug-
gests that preferences are actually constructed, not merely revealed, in the
elicitation process, and that these constructions depend on the framing of the
problem, the method of elicitation, and the available set of options.
We have suggested that the rational theory of choice provides a better ac-
count of people’s normative intuitions than of their actual behavior. When
confronted with the fact that their choices violate dominance or description
invariance, people typically wish to modify their behavior to conform with
these principles of rationality. Evidently, people’s choices are often at variance
with their own normative intuitions. The tension between normative and de-
scriptive theories of choice is analogous to the tension between normative and
descriptive theories of ethics. A normative ethical account is concerned with the
principles that underlie moral judgments. A descriptive ethical account, on the
other hand, is concerned with actual human conduct. Both enterprises are es-
sentially empirical; the first addresses people’s intuitions, whereas the second
focuses on their actual behavior. The two analyses, of course, are interrelated
but they do not coincide. For example, people generally agree that one should
abstain from lying and contribute to worthy causes, despite the fact they do not
always do so. Similarly, people tend to accept the normative force of domi-
nance and description invariance, even though these are often violated in their
actual choices. Although the distinction between the normative and descriptive
accounts is obvious in the study of ethics, it is somewhat controversial in the
study of decision making. This difference may be due to the fact that it is easier
to understand violations of ethical norms that stem from self-interest or lack of
self-control, than violations of rational norms that stem from the nature of cog-
nitive operations.
Suggestions for Further Reading
Elementary introductions to the field of behavioral decision theory include Bazerman (1992), Dawes
(1988), Hogarth (1987), and Yates (1990). von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1986) is an introduction
with more of an applied perspective, covering an area known as decision analysis. Thaler (1992)
focuses on the role of behavioral theory in interpreting numerous economic anomalies. Shafir,
Simonson, and Tversky (1993) consider the role of reasons in the making of decisions. For collec-
tions of primary articles relating behavioral decision theory to various domains of inquiry, ranging
from economics and the law to engineering and philosophy, see Arkes and Hammond (1986), and
Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky (1988). Recent reviews of the field are provided by Camerer (1995), Payne,
Bettman, and Johnson (1992), and Slovic, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1988).
Acknowledgments
Preparation of this chapter was supported by US Public Health Service Grant No. 1-R29-MH46885
from the National Institute of Mental Health, by Grant No. SBR-9408684 from the National Science
Foundation, and by a grant from the Russell Sage Foundation. It was completed while the authors
were Fellows at the Institute for Advanced Studies and the Center for Rationality and Interactive
Decision Theory of The Hebrew University.
618 Eldar Shafir and Amos Tversky