that he is brave, though I have certainly indicated, and so implicated, that this
isso.Idonotwanttosaythatmyutteranceofthissentencewouldbe,strictly
speaking, false should the consequence in question fail to hold. Sosomeimpli-
catures are conventional, unlike the one with which I introduced this discus-
sion of implicature.
I wish to represent a certain subclass of nonconventional implicatures, which
I shall callconversationalimplicatures, as being essentially connected with cer-
tain general features of discourse; so my next step is to try to say what these
features are. The following may provide a first approximation to a general
principle. Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of dis-
connected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are charac-
teristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant
recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at
least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fixed
from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for discussion), or it
may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite, or it may be so in-
definite as to leave very considerable latitude to the participants (as in a casual
conversation). But at each stage,somepossible conversational moves would be
excluded as conversationally unsuitable. We might then formulate a rough
general principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus )to observe,
namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
which you are engaged. One might label this the Cooperative Principle.
On the assumption that some such general principle as this is acceptable, one
may perhaps distinguish four categories under one or another of which will fall
certain more specific maxims and submaxims, the following of which will, in
general, yield results in accordance with the Cooperative Principle. Echoing
Kant, I call these categories Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner. The cate-
gory of Quantity relates to the quantity of information to be provided, and
under it fall the following maxims:
- Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current
purposes of the exchange). - Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
(The second maxim is disputable; it might be said that to be overinformative is
not a transgression of the Cooperative Principle but merely a waste of time.
However, it might be answered that such overinformativeness may be confus-
ing in that it is liable to raise side issues; and there may also be an indirect ef-
fect, in that the hearers may be misled as a result of thinking that there is some
particularpointin the provision of the excess of information. However this may
be, there is perhaps a different reason for doubt about the admission of this
second maxim, namely, that its effect will be secured by a later maxim, which
concerns relevance.)
Under the category of Quality falls a supermaxim—‘‘Try to make your con-
tribution one that is true’’—and two more specific maxims:
- Do not say what you believe to be false.
- Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
722 H. P. Grice