The Sudan Handbook

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not visible to the public – there was an initial uncertainty among the rank

and file members as to the identity of the new power holders. Instruc-

tions were then given to members asking them to freeze all of the old

partisan activity and to support the new regime.

Following Turabi’s release from his staged detention, he initiated a

process that culminated in the dissolution of the IM’s structure and

governing bodies. Turabi’s vision was that the IM should be built anew as

a broad and mass movement with a strong tendency towards expanding

the ranks and attracting new membership (the formula was to adopt a

ratio of 60 per cent new recruits in relation to 40 per cent from the old

membership at all levels). During the first period after the coup, the

IM’s affairs were run by the same inner circle, which was also running

the state (Turabi and his deputy, Ali Osman Taha, in addition to a few

other associates including al-Bashir). Later on this group was gradually

expanded to become an executive body of thirty members, and a wider

Shura council of around 300 members, none of whom were elected.

The IM’s membership became a reservoir from which ministers, top

state officials, security officers and occupants of other essential positions

were recruited. Likewise, IM members were brought in – by the top

leadership – to run media organs, parastatal corporations, banks as

well as institutions created by the new regime. IM members were also

called on to provide grass roots support, becoming the backbone of the

government militia, the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), and the Popular

Neighbourhood Committees, and were generally mobilized to provide

political support to the new regime as necessary. By the same token

when trades unions and other professional bodies were reconstituted

in 1992/93, IM members unsurprisingly became the leading figures of

these syndicates.

Despite the fact that the IM emerged as the undisputed constituency

of al-Bashir’s regime, it did not operate openly. One explanation of this

situation lies in the strategy of deception adopted by the Islamists who

presented their power takeover as a national non-partisan revolution. As

such it was not possible for the new regime to allow the IM as the only

The Sudan Handbook, edited by John Ryle, Justin Willis, Suliman Baldo and Jok Madut Jok. © 2011 Rift Valley Institute and contributors party that could operate openly and lawfully, when all the other parties

(www.riftvalley.net).