The Idea of Freedom 141encounters a suitable characterological disposition; that
is, if in my life to date I have developed mental pictures
of, for example, the usefulness of taking walks and the
value of health and, further, if the mental picture of tak-
ing walks is linked in me with feelings of pleasure.
Thus, we must distinguish between (1) the possible
subjective dispositions that are suited to making specific
mental pictures and concepts into motives and (2) the pos-
sible mental pictures and concepts that are capable of in-
fluencing my characterological disposition so that an act
of will results. The former represent themotive powers,
the latter thegoals of morality.
By identifying the elements that compose an individual
life, we can discover the motive powers of morality. The
first level of individual life isperceiving, particularly the
perceiving of the senses. In this region of individual life,
perceiving is immediately—without any intervening feel-
ing or concept—transformed into willing. The motive
power under consideration here is simply calleddrive.
Satisfaction of our lower, purely animal needs (hunger,
sexual intercourse, etc.) occurs in this way. The special
characteristic of the life of the drives is the immediacy
with which the individual percept activates our willing.
This immediacy, originally belonging only to the lower
sense life, can also be extended to the percepts of the
higher senses. We react to the percept of some event in
the external world without further reflection and without
linking a special feeling to it—as occurs in conventional
social behavior. We call the motive power here tact or
moral taste. The more such an immediate reaction to a