The Value of Life 205must not presuppose something else by which I first de-
termine the value or valuelessness of the pleasure. If I
say, “I want to compare the quantity of pleasure with the
quantity of pain to see which is greater,” then I must also
bring into the calculation all pleasure and pain in their ac-
tual amounts, quite apart from whether they are based on
illusion or not. Anyone who ascribes less life-value to a
pleasure based on illusion than to one that is justifiable
by reason is making the value of life dependent on fac-
tors other than pleasure.
The person who estimates pleasure at a lower rate be-
cause it attaches to a worthless object is like a merchant
who enters in his ledger the considerable profits of a toy
factory at a quarter of their worth, on the grounds that the
factory produces mere playthings for children.
If it is merely a question of weighing the relative quan-
tities of pleasure and pain, then the illusory character of
the objects of certain feelings of pleasure should be left
completely out of the picture.
With its reasoned consideration of the quantities of
pleasure and pain created by life, the path recommended
by von Hartmann therefore brings us to this point: we
knowhow we are to set up our accounts; we knowwhat
we have to place on each side of our ledger. But how
should the calculation now be made? Is reason, in fact,
equipped to reckon the balance?
If thecalculated profit does not equal a business’s de-
monstrable past profits or future gains, then the merchant
has made an error. The philosopher, too, will certainly
have made an error of assessment if it is impossible to